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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This Court should overturn the district court's order requmng production of
privileged documents. There was no semblance of compliance with Rule 3 7. The order
was in contravention of new legal authority presented to the district court, and most
importantly, in violation of public and legislative policy. Dr. Vered seeks documents
protected by the statutory care-review and peer-review privileges. These privileges exist
to protect peers and patients in the Utah health care industry whose candor is necessary to
protect those receiving health and medical treatment. Respect for and encouragement of
that candor is the highest priority here.
The district court's order compelling Defendants to produce privileged documents
was error.

Contrary to the district court's determination, Utah law is clear that an

affidavit is not required to demonstrate a party's privilege assertions; rather, all that is
required in the first instance is a privilege log - which Defendants provided. This Court
should reverse the district court's decision also because the court improperly ignored Dr.
Vered's admitted failure to meet and confer prior to the filing of his Statement of
Discovery Issues and allowed Dr. Vered to raise new arguments for the very first time
during oral argument on his motion. Lastly, this Court should reverse the district court's
order for the additional and independent reason that, under the circumstances of this case,
it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion not to at least review the documents in
camera before ordering Defendants to produce them.

By reversing the district court's decision, this Court will not preclude Dr. Vered
from seeing anything he is entitled to see. But it will require both Dr. Vered and the

I
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district court to follow the discovery dispute procedures designed to prevent the very sort
of surprise tactics that led to this appeal.
ESSENTIAL PROCEDURAL FACTS

Defendants served their written objections and responses to Dr. Vered's discovery
requests on April 24, 2014. Nearly two months later, by letter dated June 18, 2014, Dr.
Vered's counsel responded to certain of Defendants' objections and, based on
Defendants' assertions of privilege, requested that Defendants produce a privilege log.
(R. 479.) Dr. Vered's counsel concluded his letter by stating, "Please feel free to give me
a call if you would like to discuss your objections in more detail." (R. 480 (emphasis
added).) At no time did Dr. Vered's counsel contact Defendants' counsel by phone or in
person to discuss any dispute, or even to indicate that he intended to file a Statement of
Discovery Issues - let alone the purported grounds for such a motion.
Nevertheless, on September 3, 2014, Dr. Vered filed a Statement of Discovery
Issues which sought an order compelling Defendants to produce all documents and
information they had "agreed to produce." (R. 330-31.) He sought nothing more than
that.

Dr. Vered's Statement of Discovery Issues made no mention of Defendants'

assertions of privilege. It made no complaint about the lack of any supporting affidavit.
There was no mention of the privilege log Defendants produced. Yet, at the hearing on
his Statement of Discovery Issues, Dr. Vered convinced the district court that he was
entitled to an order compelling Defendants to produce all of their privileged documents
because Defendants' objection "to those items [as] protected by the peer review
privilege" was unsubstantiated by an affidavit. (R. 931; see also R. 935.) The district
2
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comi refused to reconsider its ruling in light of the Utah Supreme Court~s decision in
Allred v. Saunders, 2014 UT 43, 342 P. 3d 204~ released just 15 days later, that made
ciear a priviiege iog, not an affidavit, was required in the first instance to assert the
statutory care-review and peer-review privileges. The district court entered its order
without ever seeing the September 30, 2014 privilege log, and later required Defendants
to pay Dr. Vered $2,185.00 in attorneys' fees. {R. I 13 I.)
RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

The parties' respective recitations of the facts make clear there is no dispute
concerning the following critical points:
First, Dr. Vered admits that prior to the filing of his Statement of Discovery Issues
on September 3, 2014, which led to the district court's orders that are the subject of this
~

interlocutory appeal, Dr. Vered's counsel never met and conferred "in person or by
telephone" in an attempt to resolve the parties' disputes, as required by Utah Rule of
Judicial Administration 4-502(2)(A), which, at the time, governed the filing of

4w

Statements of Discovery Issues. (See Plf s Br. at 14-15 (identifying one letter and four
emails).) 1 It is further undisputed that the only time Dr. Vered's counsel even mentioned

1

Dr. Vered appears to suggest that Defendants' counsel did not respond to Dr. Vered's
counsel's emails. (See Plfs Br. at 15.) Not so. Although the emails were never made a
part of the record before the trial court, Defendants have attached them hereto as Exhibit
A, so that there is no confusion. Notably, at no time in any of these emails did Dr.
V ered' s counsel indicate that Defendants had waived their right to assert the priviiege,
that Dr. Vered was planning to file a Statement of Discovery Issues, nor did he request a
telephone call or in person meeting with Defendants' counsel. (See, e.g., R. 437.) To the
contrary, Dr. Vered's counsel's email of September 2, 2014, the day before he filed his
Statement of Discovery Issues, said merely, ''[P]lease let me know when I can expect to
receive your client's discovery responses. These have been outstanding for some time
3
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the possibility of a phone call prior to filing the Statement of Discovery Issues was over
two months previous, in his June 18, 2014 letter. He concluded that by stating, ·'Please
feel free to give me a call if you would like to discuss your objections in more detail."
(R. 480.) In sum, it is undisputed that at no time prior to the filing of his Statement of

Discovery Issues, did Dr. Vered discuss with Defendants at all - let alone in any
meaningful way - his intent to file a Statement of Discovery Issues, the lack of an
VIP

affidavit or other evidence in support of Defendants' assertions of the statutory carereview and peer-review privileges, or any concerns, if he had them, about Defendants'
privilege log.
Second, Dr. Vered admits that his Statement of Discovery Issues - which led to
the interlocutory orders that are the subject of this appeal - did not seek to pierce or even
raise Defendants' assertions of privilege, let alone dispute that the privilege applied. (See
Plfs Br. at 16 ("it was the defendants that first chose to raise the care/peer review
privilege").) Further, Dr. Vered has never argued and does not argue even here that the
documents Defendants have been ordered to produce are not privileged. (See generally
Plfs Br.)
Third, Dr. Vered admits that it was at the October 6, 2014 hearing on his
Statement that he raised for the first time his concerns about Defendants' assertions of

Gj)

privilege. He further admits those concerns were not directed to the adequacy of the
Defendants' privilege log, but rather to the absence of an affidavit. (See Plf s Br. at 17

now an_d my client has asked me to seek relief from the court if they are not received
soon."
4
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('~Dr. Vered argued that the log simply identified the documents being withheld and did
not contain an affidavit or some other evidence ....").)
As a resu1t, it is undisputed that the district court's orders that are the subject of
this appeal required Defendants to produce privileged documents based on the argument
that Defendants had failed to provide an affidavit in support of their assertions of
privilege, which argument was never raised prior to oral argument on Dr. Vered' s
discovery motion, and in spite of Dr. Vered's acknowledged failure to meet and confer
prior to the filing of his motion.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT AN
EVIDENTIARY "FOUNDATION" IN THE FIRST INSTANCE IS
REQUIRED TO ASSERT THE PRIVILEGE.

The trial court incorrect!y decided that Defendants were required to provide an
affidavit to establish an evidentiary basis for application of the care-review and peerreview privileges. The trial court next erred when it determined Defendants had forfeited
or waived their right to assert those statutory privileges. (See Defs' Br. at 19-23.) Dr.
Vered does not dispute there is no legal basis justifying the district court's conclusion that
Defendants waived their right to assert the care-review and peer-review privileges by not
providing an affidavit in the first instance. (Plf s Br. at 31-33.) Instead, Dr. Vered
surprisingly says that Defendants' argument is "untrue and is a gross mischaracterization
of the district court's ruling," because "[t]he district court never once used the words
'waive' or 'waiver' in any of its oral or written rulings." (Id. at 31.) Dr. Vered's memory

5
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is short, as his claim is belied by his own arguments to the trial court beating the ··waiver''
drum.

A.

Dr. Vered's Waiver Arguments to the District Court Show That
Defendants Did Not Mischaracterize the District Court's Ruling.

Contrary to Dr. Vered's argument, the mere fact that the district court did not use
the words "waive" or --waiver'' in its ruling does not mean that the court did not conclude
(erroneously) that Defendants waived or otherwise forfeited their right to assert the carereview and peer-review privileges. Dr. Vered argued this issue for the first time at the
hearing on his Statement of Discovery Issues.

(R. 926-37.)

Dr. Vered and the

Defendants each fully briefed the issue in Defendants' motion for reconsideration. (R.
433-50, 502-12, 527-33.) And, in contrast to Dr. Vered's argument here, he strongly
urged the district court to embrace his waiver argument. (R. 656-90.) Indeed, Dr. Vered
argued in opposition to Defendants' motion for reconsideration that "[s ]ince defendants
failed to comply with [the] requirement" "to provide an affidavit (or some other
evidentiary material) showing why the documents they refused to produce fell within the
peer review privilege," "this Court properly concluded that defendants had waived their
ability to invoke the privilege." (R. 508; see also R. 667 (arguing that "the status that we
have right now is an oral order from the bench requiring the defendants to essentially
respond to all of Dr. Vered' s discovery requests in full on the grounds that any privilege
that they've asserted had ~een waived.... we'd simply ask for that order to stand"), R.
668 ("The case law was clear that you have to provide an adequate evidentiary basis to
show that the documents were prepared specifically to be submitted for review purposes.

6
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Your Honor, that was why the Court deemed the privilege to be waived .... '"), R. 943
(""to withhold these documents pursuant to the peer review privilege despite two separate
rulings from this court stating that defendants have waived the privilege by failing to
produce sufficient evidentiary support for the privilege").)

~

\Vhile the district court did not use the word ~~waiver" in its rulings, Dr. Vered
vociferously argued the point and succeeded in persuading the district court to order the
production of privileged documents. Dr. Vered' s hollow claim of ''mischaracterization,.,
is, itself, a significant departure from the record and from his repeated overtures to the
district court.
B.

Allred Makes Clear that an Affidavit Is Not Required to Assert
the Privilege.

The Utah Supreme Court made clear in Allred v. Saunders that, as with any other
claim of privilege, a privilege log should be provided which must "contain sufficient
individualized information on all withheld documents or items in order to ensure that any
non-privileged documents or items (such as patient medical records) that had made their
way into a care-review or peer-review file are not shielded from discovery." 2014 UT

43,

,r

27, 342 P.3d 204.

In Allred, the plaintiffs had subpoenaed "the complete and

cumulative records and files or case investigation records related directly to the care
rendered to Lisa Allred at American Fork Hospital through the month of July 2007." Id.

at

,r

21 {alteration omitted).

In response, the Hospital offered an affidavit from the

Regional Director of Risk Management/Patient Relations who described the "electronic
event reporting system used by the Hospital in response to an incident." Id. The district

7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

court ruled that Dr. Saunders' credentialing file was not privileged because it did not
contain information covered by the statute and that the material in the Hospital's incident
file would require in camera review because the Hospital "had made a prima facie
showing that the material was privileged." Id. at ,I 6. The Supreme Court reversed and
remanded with instructions to consider the discoverability of the documents at issue in
light of the privilege rule in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(l). Id. at ,I 19.
In doing so, the Court instructed that "whether in camera review is necessary lies

in the sound discretion of the district court after it considers the foundational material
provided by the party seeking to assert the privilege." Id. at ,I 24 (emphasis added). The
"foundational material" is not an affidavit or similar evidentiary materiai2; rather, it is a
privilege log that "'describe[s] the nature of the documents, communications, or things
not produced in a manner that, without revealing the information itself, will enable the
other parties to evaluate the claim."' Id. at ,I 25 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(8)(A)).
"The opposing party may then raise any objections to the asserted privilege and the
district court may undertake in camera review when, in its sound discretion, it deems
such a review necessary to properly evaluate whether the documents or items withheld
from discovery qualify for the privilege." Id. at ,I 26.
Dr. Vered suggests that the district court's ruling is correct under Allred because
the court ordered Defendants to produce the documents without making any
determination as to whether the "claimed privilege even applies" to any of the documents
2

A "foundational fact" otherwise termed a "predicate fact," is defined as "[a] fact from
which a presumption or inference arises" or "[a] fact necessary to the operation of an
evidentiary rule." Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
8
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at issue. Dr. Vered claims this is because, without consideration of Defendants~ privilege
log or subsequently supplied affidavit, the court concluded that Defendants ··failed to

(ii

meet the evidentiary burden necessary to invoke the privilege.'~ (Plf s Br. at 31, 33.) The
law, however, requires precisely the converse of this.

When, as here, Defendants

indisputably claimed the documents are privileged, Defendants produced a privilege log,
and Dr. Vered has never disputed that the documents are privileged, the district court
erred in ordering the production of the documents. See, e.g., Allred, 2014 UT 43,

,r,r 24-

27. In other words, ordering the production of Defendants' privileged documents without
reviewing the documents in camera, ordering briefing on whether the documents are, in
fact, privileged, or even evaluating the adequacy of Defendants' privilege log entries, is
contrary to the law. See id. at

,r 27

(anticipating "individualized assessment as to the

applicability of the claimed privilege" once a privilege log is provided). It also sells short
the legislative assurances of confidentiality promised to co-workers and patients whose
candor in creating these documents is the paramount concern here.
The district court's decision that Defendants were precluded from relying on the
privilege because Defendants produced only a privilege log and not an affidavit is·
contrary to the law, and this Court should reverse it. (See Defs' Br. at 18-23.)

C.
ThP
...... _..
~

Dr. Vered Has Never Identified What Information Is Lacking
from Defendants' Privilege Log.
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documents collected and reviewed by that date, and was never intended to be Defendants'
~

final log. (See, e.g., R. 474-75.) Yet Dr. Vercd argues that the district court's order
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should be affirmed because the privilege log provided by Defendants was not '•full and
complete." 3 (Plf s Br. at 25.) That log did, however, identify the type of document
withheld, the date of the document, who or what entity the document was from, the
recipients (if any) of the document, the subject or description of the document, and the
specific privilege asserted. (R. 423-32.) For example, among the documents they were
withholding, Defendants identified the following:
<.::P

•

a letter from Tim Moran (Hospital CEO) and James Antinori (Hospital
Chief of Staff) to the Medical Executive Committee regarding ''request for
corrective action investigation";

•

a "[d]isruptive [r]eport" for "incidents dated 6/6/2012";

•

an undated chart outlining all "disruptive reports and complaints";

•

an email from Kyle Simonton (outside counsel for the Hospital) to Philip
Eaton, Joleen Perez, Curtis Drake, Mark Morris, and Vivek Chandra dated

3

In a footnote, Dr. Vered says the fact that Defendants did not discuss the substance of
the affidavit from Joleen Perez that was submitted as part of Defendants' motion for
reconsideration means Defendants' "have conceded the inadequacy of Ms. Perez's
affidavit." {Plfs Br. at 29 n.2.) Not so. Defendants did not discuss Ms. Perez's affidavit
in their opening brief because the district court wholly ignored it. (See, e.g., R. 663
("How does the 10 page log provide . . . sufficient foundational material to establish that
each withheld document or item was created specifically for an investigation .... ", R.
666 ("I ruled the way I did based on the responses to discovery that plaintiff was getting
almost nothing in response, and then when we look at the log, I was concerned about that
not establishing a basis, and then - and I did take into consideration the lack of the
affidavit .... ").) So there is no question, Defendants never conceded and do not now
concede that Ms. Perez's affidavit was inadequate. It was not and is not. Under Allred, it
also is not necessary - particularly, when ~e lack of an affidavit was never raised by the
moving party in a meet and confer or even in the party's discovery statement.
10
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May 20, 2014 concemmg ··Dr. Vered's response to the pending peer
Gw

.
..,4
reviews·
; and

e

minutes from Medical Executive Committee executive sessions at which
Dr. Vered was discussed. (R. 423-32.)5

In spite of these obviously privileged documents, Dr. Vered never met and conferred with
Defendants with respect to any concerns he had with the adequacy of Defendants'
privilege log and never articulated any such concerns to the district court. (See Plf s Br.
at 17.) Instead, he told the district court that the privilege log - regardless of its contents
- would not suffice because Defendants were obligated to ''submit an affidavit or some
witness testimony to show that the documents" were privileged. (R. 929-30.)
In his response brief, Dr. Vered, for the first time, complains that Defendants'
privilege log is inadequate because it "does not even list each document or item being
withheld, much less provide any foundation that explains why the document is
privileged." (Plfs Br. at 25.) Even now, Dr. Vered never explains what information is
purportedly missing or why he is supposedly unable to tell whether a document identified
by Defendants is privileged. Instead, as support for his assertion, Dr. Vered cites to
Defendants' statement in their motion for reconsideration indicating that the log provided

4

As indicated on Defendants' log, this email is not only protected by the care-review and
peer-review privileges, it is also protected by the attorney-client privilege. (R. 426.) Yet,
under the district court's order - if not reversed - Defendants will have to produce even
that document.
5
It is important to note that a number of the entries had names or other identifying
information redacted so as not to disclose the identity of the complainants, so the
information provided in the log was necessarily limited. (See, e.g., R. 423 (disruptive
incident report).)
11
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on September 30, 2014, did not contain all responsive, but privileged documents. (See R.
448.) As noted above, however, this was not because Defendants did not intend to log
the additional documents or that the entries on the September 30, 2014 log did not reflect
individual documents; it was because Defendants had not yet collected or reviewed all of
the documents responsive to Dr. Vered's requests. (R. 474-75.) Ultimately, Defendants
produced a revised log in October 2014 (R. 1040-62) and again in October 2015 (R.
1064-73) and a series of additional privilege logs totaling 122 pages. 6 (See R. 107 5-114,
1421-1512.) For the record, Dr. Vered has made no objection concerning the adequacy
of those supplemental logs.
This Court should reject also Dr. Vered's argument that Defendants' decision not
to supplement their privilege log during the pendency of their motion for reconsideration
is somehow evidence of dilatory conduct or bad faith. (Plfs Br. at 28-29, 35.) That is
preposterous.

Defendants had no way of knowing that the motion would not get

scheduled for hearing until August 2015 (apparently, the result of a court computer
glitch). (Plfs Br. at 19.) During the intervening months after the district court ordered
production of Defendants' privileged documents, Dr. Vered never demanded production
of a supplemental log or even the privileged documents themselves. Most importantly,
the district court had concluded that a privilege log was insufficient, which is why
0P

Defendants included an affidavit with their motion for reconsideration. (R. 410-51.)
Defendants did, however, promptly produce their supplemental logs after the district
court's ruling on their motion for reconsideration. (See R. 1075-115, 1421-1512.)
6

To date, Defendants have also produced 2,932 pages of documents to Dr. Vered.
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Defendants' counsel also did not admit, as Dr. Vered claims, that Defendants~
September 2014 privilege log was insufficient. (See Plfs Br. at 19-20.) Rather, at the
hearing on the motion for reconsideration, and in hopes of facilitating a more reasoned
process to protect privileged documents, Defendants' counsel stated he did not know
whether the log ''satisfies all the foundational requirements that came out about three
weeks after [Defendants] provided the privilege log," in the Allred decision, but that
Defendants had not "yet heard . . . from the plaintiff any specificity in terms of what
could be wrong with it or what more they want to know." (R. 658-59.) This merely
indicated Defendants' good faith willingness to supplement their log, and their
uncertainty as to what (if anything) was insufficient about the logs they had produced.
Defendants were - and remain - uncertain because Dr. Vered has never specified what
information is purportedly lacking from any of Defendants' privilege logs.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE DISTRICT COURT'S
ORDER FOR DR. VERED'S ADMITTED FAILURE TO MEET AND
CONFER.

Dr. Vered's admitted failure to adequately meet and confer prior to the filing of
his Statement of Discovery Issues is reason alone to reverse the district court's ruling. At
the time Dr. Vered filed his Statement of Discovery Issues, Utah Rule of Judicial
Administration 4-502(2)(A) required the moving party to "[m]eet and confer regarding
the issues, in person or by telephone, and attempt in good faith to resolve or narrow the
issues without court involvement." 7 (Emphasis added.) According to Dr. Vered, this

7

This requirement has since been incorporated into Rule 37. See Utah R. Civ. P.
37(a)(2)(B). Notably, the Rule 37 requirement appears to permit a party to satisfy the
13
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requirement is satisfied by his counsel's claimed offer to meet and confer by phone. Also
according to Dr. Vered, Defendants' argument to the contrary is based on an unfair ·~strict
interpretation[] of the rules.'' (Plfs Br. at 34.) This Court should reject Dr. Vered's selfserving vacillation between adhering to the rules and being excused from their strict
interpretation.
Dr. Vered's arguments are contrary to the law; his counsel's written
communication that Defendants' counsel should "feel free to give [him] a call if [they]
would like to discuss [Defendants'] objections in more detail" sent months before Dr.
Vered filed his Statement of Discovery Issues cannot - as a matter of law - satisfy the
letter or even the spirit of Utah's meet and confer requirement. 8 (See Plfs Br. at 34.)
While there is no Utah appellate court decision addressing the scope or importance
of Utah's meet and confer requirement, many other courts have addressed similar
requirements.

Those courts have nearly universally concluded that, absent exigent

circumstances, written communications - and certainly a single letter sent months before
filing the discovery motion and without any mention of a potential motion - are
insufficient.

For example, Utah trial courts have addressed the requirement and

concluded that ''the meet and confer obligation . . . requires more than an exchange of
meet-and-confer requirement by certifying that it "attempted to confer with the other
affected parties in person or by telephone." Id. The previous rule - in effect at the time
of the relevant events - did not include such an exception. See Utah R. Judicial Admin.
4-502(2)(A) (prior to filing a statement of discovery issues, the parties "shall .... [m]eet
and confer regarding the issues, in person or by telephone, and attempt in good faith to
resolve or narrow the issues without court involvement").
8
Defendants are not, as suggested by Dr. Vered, making "an after-the-fact argument."
(Plf s Br. at 35.) To the contrary, Defendants raised Dr. Vered's failure to meet and
confer in their opposition to Dr. Vered's Statement of Discovery Issues. (See R. 337.)
14
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emails. It expressly requires counsel to ~[m]eet and confer regarding the issues, in person
or by telephone."' Pitcher v. iSchool Campus, LLC, Case No. 130500597, 2015 WL

5177799, at *2 (Utah Dist. Ct. July 7, 2015) (unpublished; emphasis in original) (quoting
Utah Rule of Judicial Administration 4-502(2)(A) and awarding fees due to the plaintiffs'

Gi&J

failure to meet and confer); see also Schoonover Plumbing & Heating v. Benedica LLC,
Case No. 130400594, 2014 WL 11071540, at *1 (Utah Dist. Ct. May 20, 2014)
(unpublished) (denying without prejudice defendants' Statement of Discovery Issues
because defendants ''did not meet and confer with Plaintiffs' counsel and attempt in good
faith to resolve the purported deficiencies in Plaintiffs' initial disclosures"). 9

~

Federal district courts that have considered comparable local rules from around the
country have reached similar conclusions.

See, e.g.~ McWatters v. Cherry Creek
~

Strategic Advisory, LLC, Case No. l:13-CV-1229, 2014 WL 2957739, at *2 (W.D.
Mich. July 1, 2014) (unpublished) ("An exchange of curt e-mails is almost never
successful in resolving discovery disputes. For precisely this reason, the court requires
counsel to engage each other on a personal level. Although a preliminary exchange of emails may be useful in identifying the issues, a moving party does not satisfy Local Rule
7.1 (d) unless and until he attempts to speak to opposing counsel."); HSBC Bank USA,
Nat. Ass'n v. Resh, Case No. 3:12-CV-00668, 2014 WL 317820, at *8 (S.D. W. Va. Jan.
28, 2014) (unpublished) ("a letter on its own does not satisfy the meet and confer
requirement"); Wesley v. Gates, No. C 08-2719 SI, 2009 WL 1955997, at *1 n.2 (N.D.
Cal. July 2, 2009) (unpublished) ("The mere sending of a written, electronic, or voice9

Copies of all unpublished cases cited herein are attached as Exhibit B.
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mail communication, however, does not satisfy a requirement to "meet and confer' or to
01

"confer.~

Rather, this requirement can be satisfied only through direct dialogue and

discussion-either in a face to face meeting or in a telephone conversation."); Ross v.
Citifinancial, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 239, 239-40 (S.D. Miss. 2001) (holding that sending a
letter discussing the discovery issue did not satisfy the meet-and-confer requirement or
the prerequisite of a certification of having conferred in good faith); Cotracom
Commodity Trading Co. v. Seaboard Corp., 189 F.R.D. 456, 458-59 (D. Kan. 1999) (four
telephone calls by the movant were insufficient to satisfy the meet-and-confer
requirement where all four calls took place while opposing counsel was out of the
country on vacation; noting that the meet-and-confer requirement is intended to require
counsel to "converse, confer, compare views, consult and deliberate").
In sum, Dr. Vered's counsel's invitation to call in his June 18, 2014 letter, sent
months before the filing of his Statement of Discovery Issues and without giving any
indication to Defendants that he intended to seek affirmative relief in the district court
failed utterly to satisfy Utah's meet-and-confer requirement. 10 The consequence of that
failure has been this interlocutory appeal.

The parties are, for example, now left

disputing before this Court issues, including the adequacy of Defendants' privilege logs,
which probably could (and should) have been resolved by meaningful, good faith meet
10

Dr. Vered's certification that he "in good faith conferred with defendants' counsel in
an effort to resolve the issues giving rise to the discovery issue without court action" (R.
333), even if true, also is insufficient. ''A conclusory statement in an affidavit asserting
that the movant fulfilled the meet-and-confer requirement is insufficient. Rather, the
movant must detail the efforts to confer and explain why they proved fruitless."
Prescient Partners, L.P. v. Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc., Case No. 96 CIV. 7590(DAB)JCF,
1998 WL 67672, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 1998) (unpublished; citations omitted).
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and confer discussions or, at the very least, clarified and properly raised before the trial
court in the first instance.
For Dr. Vered's failure alone, this Court should reverse the district court's
interlocutory order requiring Defendants to produce privileged documents.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY REFUSING
TO REVIEW IN CAMERA THE DISPUTED DOCUMENTS
BEFORE ORDERING PRODUCTION.

This Court should reverse the district court's order for the additional and
independent reason that ordering production under the circumstances of this case without
at least reviewing the documents in camera was an abuse of discretion. (Defs' Br. at 2526.) Contrary to Dr. Vered's argument, Defendants do not contend that in camera review
is mandatory in every instance in which the care-review and peer-review privileges are
raised. (See Plf s Br. at 29-30.) Rather, Defendants contend that when, as here, a party
has asserted the privilege, provided a privilege log (and an affidavit), and there is no
dispute that many (if not all) of the documents are, in fact, privileged, the trial court must
exercise its discretion to review the documents in camera. This is consistent with the
Court's admonition in Allred that "whether in camera review is necessary lies in the
sound discretion of the district court after it considers foundational material provided by
the party seeking to assert the privilege." 2014 UT 43, ,I 24 (emphasis added). Here, the
court never considered - let alone evaluated - the foundational material provided by
Defendants. An in camera review under such circumstances is necessary in order to
protect those individuals "who furnish information regarding the quality of health care
rendered by any individual or facility," Benson v. I.H.C. Hosps., Inc., 866 P.2d 537, 540
17
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~

(Utah 1993) (quotation omitted), •-in order to ensure an open exchange of accurate
information between personnel and administrators in order to improve the effectiveness
of studies, evaluations, and any measures implemented to improve hospitals and the
quality of the health care they provide," Cannon v. Salt Lake Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 2005
UT App 352,

,r

22, 121 P.3d 74. It also is critical because the release of information

protected by the care-review and peer-review privileges subjects Defendants to criminal
penalties. Utah Code Ann. § 26-25-5( 1).
The district court erred by ordering Defendants to produce their privileged
documents without at least reviewing the documents in camera, given that the court
ignored Dr. Vered's failure to meet and confer, allowed Dr. Vered to raise new
arguments in his Statement of Discovery, never articulated any deficiencies in
Defendants' privilege log, and refused even to consider Defendants' affidavit in support
of their assertions of privilege. Finally, the district court erred by ordering Defendants to
pay Dr. Vered $2,185.00 in attorneys' fees.
IV.

DR. VERED SHOULD PAY DEFENDANTS' ATTORNEYS' FEES

It is Dr. Vered's failure to meet and confer, and his making surprise arguments
that bring the parties here.

The district court erroneously charged Defendants with

paying Dr. Vered $2,185.00 in attorneys' fees in connection with his original Statement
of Discovery Issues. (R. 1131.) This Court should vacate that order, with instructions to
the district court that Rule 37 entitles Defendants to reasonable attorneys' fees and costs
for properly resisting the Statement of Discovery Issues, for seeking reconsideration in
light of Allred, and here on appeal. See Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20, ,r 31,
18
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20 P.3d 388 C-"because we have reversed the trial court's order, we also vacate the trial
court's award of attorney fees to Axiom"); Utah R. Civ. P. 37(a)(K) (court may order

··that a party pay the reasonable costs, expenses and attorney fees incWTed on account of
the statement of discovery issues if the relief requested is granted or denied .... '").
CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons set forth herein and in Defendants' opemng brief,
Defendants request that the Court reverse the interlocutory order of the trial court
requiring Defendants to produce documents protected by the statutory care-review and
peer-review privileges and remand with instructions to require the parties to meet and
confer with respect to any objections Dr. Vered may have with respect to Defendants'
privilege logs.

This Court should also instruct the trial court to reverse the order

requiring Defendants to pay attorneys' fees, with instructions to award reasonable
attorneys' fees to Defendants. In the event the parties are unable to resolve their disputes,
the trial cow1 should permit the parties to brief the question whether the disputed
documents are privileged and allow Defendants to submit supporting evidence. If, after
consideration of the parties' arguments and evidence, the trial court lacks sufficient

~

information to determine whether the privilege applies, it should exercise its discretion to
conduct an in camera review of the documents to determine whether the documents are
Gv
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(ii;.,

privilegea. If they are privileged, of course the district court cannot order Defendants to
produce them.
Dated this 20th day of July, 2016.

SNELL & WILMER L.L.P.

f2cj !2~----Mark 0. Morris
PaulW.Shakespear
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
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From:

Sent:
To:
Subject:

Gary Guelker <gary@jandglegal.com>
Wednesday, Auqust 13, 2014 9:30 AM
Morris, Mark
RE: Dr. Vered v. Tooele Hosp. Corp.

Mark:
Thank you for your email. Please let me know w hat days you might be available for these depositions during the
last week of August or the first week of September, and I will go ahead and schedule them. I am thinking a half
day for each witness, so t wo days total.
Dr. Va red is on vacation this week, so I will check with him on the text messages when he arrives back next
w eek. I also look fo rwa rd to receiving the defendants' discove ry responses fro m you. Please let me know when
I might expect to receive them.
Regards,
GG

From: Morris, Mark (mailto:mmorris@swlaw.com]
Sent: Saturday, August 09, 2014 4:16 PM
To: 'Gary Guelker'
Cc: Wirthlin, John
Subject: RE: Dr. Vered v. Tooele Hosp. Corp.
Gary, the 21" and 22 nd don't work with my schedule. I'll reach out to the people you wa nt to depose, but
please suggest some other dates. Are you thin king you'll be a ha lf day with each w itness?
I' ll get back to you on our production. Also, please let me know the timing of Dr. Vered producing copies of his
text s with individ uals listed on the parties' disclosures.
Ma rk

•
•

Mark 0. Morris
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P.
15 W. South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Office General: 801.257.1900
Office Direct : 801.257.1904
Facsimile: 801.257 .1800
Cell: 801.541.9711
mmorris@swlaw .com www.swlaw.com

Denver, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Los Cabos, Orange County, Phoenix, Reno, Salt Lake City, Tucson
1

•
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This email ,:·1ay bt':: artor-:iey privileged and confidential. intended oniy for the individual named above. If you are not that
person any dissen,ination, distribution or copyi11g of this email is prohibited. !f you receive this in error, please immediately
r"10tif,,.- rne at (801) 257-1904, and perrnanentiy de!ete this en:aiL /\ny t3x adv!ce :nc!uded in thi~ ernai? !s net :ntendcC Jnd
cannot be used for any purpose.

From: Gary Guelker [mailto:gary@jandglegal.com]

Sent: Friday, August 08, 2014 10:00 AM
To: Morris, Mark

Subject: Dr. Vered v. Tooele Hosp. Corp.
Dear Mark:
We would like to conduct depositions of certain witnesses identified by Dr. Vered in his deposition, namely
Christa Enders, Cullen Archer, Merila Teveras and Ryan Empey. We would like to schedule the depositions for
August 21-22. Is there anything that would prevent you or one of your colleagues from attending on those
dates? Please let me know.
Also, I believe there was a considerable amount of discovery that you were waiting to disclose until a protective
order was put into place. Now that an order has been signed, I would like to obtain the documents and
responses. Please let me know when I can obtain these from you early next week.
Thank you.

GG
Gary R. Guelker
Jenson &. Guelker
747 East South Temple Street, Suite 130
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: 801.579.0800
Facsimile: 801.579.0801
THE INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTS CONTAINED IN OR ATTACHED TO THIS EMAIL ARE CONFIDENTIAL. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED
ANO/OR WORK-PRODUCT DOCUMENTS, AND ARE INTENDED ONLY FOR USE BY THE INTENDED RECIPIENT(S). IF THE DOCUMENTS OR
INFORMATION ARE RECEIVED BY SOMEONE OTHER THAN THE INTENDED RECIPIENT(S), OR AN EMPLOYEE OR AGENT RESPONSIBLE FOR
DELIVERING SUCH INFORMATION TO THE INTENDED RECIPIENT(S), YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED THAT ANY USE. DISCLOSURE. DISTRIBUTION OR
COPYING OF THE DOCUMENTS OR INFORMATION IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED.
IF YOU HAVE RECEIVED THIS EMAIL IN ERROR, PLEASE IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY US BY TELEPHONE AT 801.579-0800 SO THAT WE CAN ARRANGE FOR
THE RETURN AND/OR DESTRUCTION OF THE DOCUMENTS ANO INFORMATION. THANK YOU.
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--------------From:

Sent
To:
Subject

Gary Guelker <gary@jandglegal.com>
Tuesday, September 02, 2014 10:31 AM
Shakespear, Paul
RE: Vered v. Tooele Hosp. Corp.

Dear Paul:
As a follow-up to Mark's email below, please let me know when I can expect to receive your client's discovery

responses. These have been outstanding for some time now and my client has asked me to seek relief from the
court if they are not received soon.
Thanks, and I look forward to working with you on this case.
Regards,
GG
--Original MessageFrom: Morris, Mark (mailto:mmorris@swlaw.com)
Sent: Monday, September 01, 2014 9:23 PM
To: Gary Guelker
Cc: Shakespear, Paul
Subject: Re: Vered v. Tooele Hosp. Corp.
Gary, John Wirthlin, the associate who has been assisting me, has moved to Florida and Paul Shakespear of my
firm will be helping me from here on out. He will be responsible for completing our discovery obligations, and I'll
rely on him to relay timing.
Since you may need to subpoena your proposed deponents, it may make sense to put a couple of dates far
enough out there to accommodate that. Please suggest some you think will make sense, and yes, thank you for
updating your disclosures. I trust they will identify these people Or. Vered appears to believe have important
information.
Kind regards,
Mark
Mark 0. Morris
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P.
15 W. South Temple, Suite 1200<x-apple-data-detectors://O/O>
Salt Lake City, UT 84101<x-apple-data-detectors://O/O>
Office: 801.257.1904<tel:801.257.1904>
mmorris@swlaw.com<mailto:mmorris@swlaw .com> www.swlaw.com<http ://www.swlaw.com/>
[cid :image002.png@01CE6001.CAEF7 ASO]
Denver, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Los Cabos, Orange County, Phoenix, Reno, Salt Lake City, Tucson
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This email may be attorney privileged and confidential, intended only for the individual named above. If you are
not that person any dissemination, distribution or copying of this email is prohibited. If you receive this in error,
please immediately notify me at (801) 257-1904<tel:(801)%20257-1904>, and permanently delete this email.
On Aug 28, 2014, at 10:47, 11 Gary Guelker 11 <gary@ja_o_g_glegal.com<mailto:gary@jandglegal.com» wrote:
Mark:
I received Dr. Vered's text messages last week and I am in the process of reviewing them now. I will also be
sending you an updated set of initial disclosures in the next day or two.
In light of this, I would like to go ahead and schedule the depositions we talked about doing earlier this month.
In order to do so, I need to obtain your client's discovery which I have been waiting to receive. I need to have
this rather soon. Please let me know when I can expect to receive it. Also, please provide me some dates when
some from your office can do depositions, preferably the week beginning Sept. 15.
Thank you.

GG
Gary R. Guelker
Jenson & Guelker
747 East South Temple Street, Suite 130
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: 801.579.0800
Facsimile: 801.579.0801
THE INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTS CONTAINED IN OR ATTACHED TO THIS EMAIL ARE CONFIDENTIAL,
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED AND/OR WORK-PRODUCT DOCUMENTS, AND ARE INTENDED ONLY FOR USE BY
THE INTENDED RECIPIENT(S). IF THE DOCUMENTS OR INFORMATION ARE RECEIVED BY SOMEONE OTHER THAN
THE INTENDED RECIPIENT(S), OR AN EMPLOYEE OR AGENT RESPONSIBLE FOR DELIVERING SUCH INFORMATION
TO THE INTENDED RECIPIENT(S), YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED THAT ANY USE, DISCLOSURE, DISTRIBUTION OR
COPYING OF THE DOCUMENTS OR INFORMATION IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED.
IF YOU HAVE RECEIVED THIS EMAIL IN ERROR, PLEASE IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY US BY TELEPHONE AT 801.5790800 SO THAT WE CAN ARRANGE FOR THE RETURN AND/OR DESTRUCTION OF THE DOCUMENTS AND
INFORMATION. THANK YOU.
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HSBC Bank USA, Nat. Ass'n v. Resh, Not Reported in F.Supp.3d (2014)
2014 WL 317820
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2014 WL317820
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, S.D. West Virginia.
HSBC BANK USA, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff,

v.
Ron RESH and Valarie Reynolds-Resh, Defendants;
Counter Claimants; and Third Party Plaintiffs,

Plaintiffs Ron Resh and Valarie Reynolds-Resh (.. the
Reshes") in opposition to Realty Concepts' objections.
For the reasons stated below, Realty Concepts' motion
to strike (ECF No. 184) is GRANTED in part, Realty
Concepts' objections (ECF No. 172) are DE1'il"ED, and the
Magistrate's Memorandum Opinion and Order (ECF No.
168) is AFFIRMED. The Court FINDS that Third Party
Plaintiffs the Reshes are entitled to an award of $4,297.
The Court accordingly LIFTS the stay pre"fously granted
in this matter (ECF No. 173).

V.

Realty Concepts, Ltd; Andrew Brosnac; Colliers
International Valuation & Advisory Services, LLC;
Philip Steffen; Lawyer's Title Insurance Corporation;
and Helen Sullivan, Third Party Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3=12-cv-00668.

I
Jan. 28, 2014.
Attorneys and Law Firms

W. Bradley Sorrells, Joseph Kendall Merical, Robinson &
McElwee, Charleston, WV, for Plaintiff.
Shawn J. Lau, Lau & Associates, Reading, PA, Ancil
G. Ramey, Steptoe & Johnson, Charleston, WV,
for Defendants, Counter Claimants, and Third Party
Plaintiffs.
Alexander W. Saksen, Amie Marie Mihalko, Jill D.
Helbling, Katlin L. Connelly, Gordon & Rees, John
William Burns, Dickie McCamey & Chilcote, Pittsburgh,
PA, Bryant J. Spann, Christopher S. Dodrill, M. David
Griffith, Jr., Susan M. Robinson, Thomas Combs &
Spann, Michael A. Olivio, Olivio & Griffith, R. Terrance
Rodgers, Kay Casto & Chaney, Charleston, WV, for
Third Party Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ROBERT C. CHAMBERS, Chief Judge.

*1 Pending before the Court are objections (ECF No.
172) by Third Party Defendant Realty Concepts, Ltd.
("Realty Concepts"), to the Magistrate Judge's Order
entered on May 20, 2013. Also pending is a motion
(ECF No. 184) by Realty Concepts to strike portions of
Docket Number 183, which is the response by Third Party

I. Statement of Facts
Discovery in this case has been very contentious. On
November 5, 2012, the Reshes served their first set
of interrogatories, their first request for production of
documents, and a request for admissions on Realty
Concepts. Certificates of Service. ECF Nos. 56, 60, 63.
The Reshes and Realty Concepts stipulated that Realty
Concepts would have until January 2, 2013, to respond
to these requests. Stipulation, ECF No 72. On January
2, 2013, Realty Concepts provided responses but did
not include any documents requested by the Reshes.
Mem. Op. & Order at 2, May 20, 2013, ECF No.
198 (hereinafter "'Award Order"). Realty Concepts then
produced documents on January 7, 2013. Id On January
30, 2013, the Reshes alerted Realty Concepts via letter that
the Reshes viewed the discovery responses as problematic
and that the Reshes would file a motion to compel
if Realty Concepts did not supplement its answers as
necessary within two days. that is, by February l, 2013.
Letter from Shawn J. Lau to Jill D. Helbling. Jan. 30,
2013, Ex. B, ECF No. 125-2. Subsequent emails between
counsel did not settle this discovery dispute. Award Order
at 3. The Reshes filed their motion to compel on February
1, 2013. Mot. Compel, ECF No. 110.
On February 26, 2013, Magistrate Judge Cheryl A. Eifert
entered an order that granted the motion to compel in
part. Order, ECF No. 126. In this order, the Magistrate
overruled all of Realty Concepts' "general objections" 1 to
the discovery requests. Id ,r 1. The Magistrate additionally
ordered Realty Concepts to provide a privilege Jog, other
responsive documents, and certain interrogatory answers
within ten days of entry of the order. Id ml 2-4. A hearing
was set for March 15, 2013. to resolve any outstanding
issues, but "[t]he parties [were] encouraged to continue
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discussing ways in which the matters in dispute may be
resolved withoutjudicial intervention." Icl ~ 5.

attorney's fees. But the court must not order this
payment if:

The parties met to discuss discovery on March 6, '.!013.
a meeting which Realty Concepts allegedly believed
resolved the outstanding discovery dispute. Award Order
at 3. Realty Concepts produced documents on April 9,
2013. Id. Realty Concepts emailed counsel for the Reshes
on April 24. 2013, asking if the discovery dispute had
been resolved with the production of these documents.
Email from Ms. Helbling. Ex. K, ECF No. 166-1 t. Realty
Concepts produced more documents on April 25. 2013,
and the next day notified the Reshes that even more
documents would be forthcoming. Award Order at 3.

(i) the movant filed the motion before attempting in
good faith to obtain the disclosure or discovery without
court action:

*2 After two joint continuances, the hearing originally
scheduled for March 15, 2013, was held on April 29, 2013.
The Magistrate granted the motion to compel and ordered
Realty Concepts to provide all outstanding documents for
the remaining discovery requests within ten days of entry
of the order granting the motion to compel. Order at 2,
Apr. 29, 2013, ECF No. 153. At the hearing, the Reshes
orally requested an award of reasonable fees and costs
incurred in bringing the motion to compel. The Magistrate
accordingly set a deadline for the Reshes to file an itemized
affidavit of fees and costs and for Realty Concepts to
respond. Id.
Counsel for the Reshes subsequently submitted an
affidavit requesting expenses in the amount of$10,605.50.
Am. Aff. Shawn J. Lau, ECF No. 156. Realty Concepts
filed a response in opposition, arguing that an award
should not be granted for several reasons. ECF No. 166.
On May 20, 20 J3, the Magistrate entered a Memorandum
Opinion and Order finding that the Reshes were entitled to
an award for reasonable costs and fees pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5) and granting an award of
$4,297. Award Order, ECF No. 168.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 governs motions for
an order compelling disclosure or discovery. The Rule
specifies:
If the motion is granted-or if the disclosure or
requested discovery is provided after the motion was
filed-the court must, after giving an opportunity to
be heard, require the party or deponent whose conduct
necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising
that conduct, or both to pay the movant's reasonable
expenses incurred in making the motion, including

{ii) the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or
objection was substantially justified; or
{iii) other circumstances make an award of expenses
unjust.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(5)(A).
Realty Concepts timely filed objections to the order
granting expenses, arguing that the Magistrate erred in
granting this award. Objections, ECF No. 172. These
objections center on whether the Reshes attempted to
resolve the dispute in good faith before filing the motion
to compel, whether an award is unjust, and calculation
of the award itself. 2 The Reshes filed a response, ECF
No. 183, and Realty Concepts filed a reply, ECF No. 185.
Realty Concepts also filed a motion to strike portions of
the Reshes's response to the objections. Mot. Strike, June
24, 2013, ECF No. 184. The Reshes filed a response to the
motion to strike, ECF No. 187, and Realty Concepts filed
a reply, ECF No. 191. The objections to the Magistrate's
order and the motion to strike are now ripe for resolution.
Realty Concepts raises eight objections to the Magistrate's
order. One of these objections questions the procedure by
which the request for expenses was made. That objection
must be addressed before turning to Realty Concepts'
other objections, which go to the merits of the decision
to grant an award. Therefore, the Court discusses the
propriety of a request for expenses without a formal
motion in Section II. The Court then assesses the motion
to strike in Section III. The Court explains the standard
of review applicable to a magistrate's non-dispositive
order in Section IV. Sections V through IX explore
Realty Concepts' objections to the granting of any award
whatsoe~er. Lastly, Section X assesses the reasonableness
of the award given.

IT. Request for Expenses Without a Formal Motion
*3 Realty Concepts argues that the Reshes's informal
oral request for expenses at the hearing on April 29, 2013,
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was not a valid motion for relief and that the Magistrate's
order granting reasonable fees therefore violates Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 7. That Rule states in pertinent
part:

compel the next day. A review of the record confirms that
these two attempted calls were not previously discussed.

A request for a court order must be made by motion.
The motion must:

and confer session." 3 Mot. Strike at 4-5. Realty Concepts
insists that the phone call only concerned document
production and did not involve Realty Concepts' written
responses to the discovery request or the types of
documents provided by Realty Concepts. ld The Court
notes that the January 4. 2013. phone call was already
part of the record well before the Magistrate awarded
reasonable expenses. Mot. Compel ,i 10, ECF No. 110;
Mem. Supp. Mot. Compel at 3, ECF No. 111; Reply Supp.
Mot. Compel at 2, ECF No. 125: Itemized Invoice of
Expenses at 2, Ex. A, ECF No. 156--1. The Magistrate's
Memorandum Opinion and Order granting the award.
however, does not mention this phone call.

(A) be in writing unless made during a hearing or trial;
(B) state with particularity the grounds for seeking the
order; and
(C) state the relief sought.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(b)(I ). Realty Concepts cites no authority
in support of its argument.

~

When a motion to compel has been granted, this district
has previously allowed the prevailing party to file an
affidavit of costs incurred in filing the motion without
filing a formal motion for that monetary relief. See Erie
Ins. Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Johnson, 272 F.R.D. 177, 185
(S.D.W.Va.2010); Wolfe v. Green, 257 F.R.D. 109, 114
(S.D.W.Va.2009). Based on this authority, the Court finds
that the Reshes were not required to request reasonable
costs prior to filing the motion to compel or in the course
of that motion's resolution. Contrary to what Realty
Concepts claims, the Reshes had not waived their right
for reimbursement of expenses when they made their oral
request for costs at the hearing on April 29, 2013. The
request for costs was properly before the court, and so
Realty Concepts' objection on that ground is denied.

Realty Concepts also takes issue with the Reshes's attempt
to characterize a phone call on January 4, 2013. as a ··meet

*4 In that order, the Magistrate made the finding that
"the Reshes did not comply with the spirit of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(l) or the explicit language of
Local Rule 37.l(b)." Award Order at 7. Realty Concepts
argues that because the Reshes did not file an objection
to this finding, the Reshes ~annot now bring forward
new evidence to rebut that finding. Furthermore, Realty
Concepts argues that a district court cannot consider new
evidence when reviewing a magistrate's non-dispositive
order. The Reshes counter that there was no reason for
them to present this "new" evidence any earlier than they
did.
Motions to strike material from a pleading are governed
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f):

m. Motion to Strike

~

The Court next turns to the pending motion to strike.
Realty Concepts filed a motion to strike portions of
Docket Number 183, which is the Reshes's response
in opposition to Realty Concepts' objections. Realty
Concepts argues that the Reshes include evidence in their
response which was not previously before the Magistrate
and requests that the Court accordingly strike that
material. Specifically, the Reshes's response states that
the Reshes's counsel called counsel for Realty Concepts
to discuss the underlying discovery dispute on or about
January 31, 2013, ultimately leaving messages for two of
the lawyers. Resp. at 4. The Reshes filed the motion to

The court may strike from a pleading an insufficient
defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous matter. The court may act:
(1) on its own; or
(2) on motion made by a party either before responding
to the pleading or, if a response is not allowed, within
21 days after being served with the pleading.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). This district has previously treated
motions to strike as incredibly disfavored:
A motion to strike is a drastic
remedy which is disfavored by the
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courts and infrequently granted.
Before granting a motion to strike.
a court must be convinced there
are no questions of fact. that any
questions of law are clear and not
in dispute, and that under no set
of circumstances could the defense
succeed.

Clark 11. Atfilam, 152 F.R.D. 66, 70 (S.D.W.Va.1993)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Case law is somewhat unclear about a judge's ability
to consider new evidence when reviewing a magistrate's
non-dispositive order such as the order granting expenses
4

incurred in filing the motion to compel. The Third
Circuit holds that when the district court reviews a
magistrate's non-dispositive order, it ''is not permitted
to receive further evidence; it is bound by the clearly
erroneous rule in reviewing questions of fact.., Haines
v. Liggett Grp. Inc .. 975 F.2d 81, 91 (3d Cir.1992).
Some district courts have similarly held. See, e.g., Koch
Materials Co. v. Shore Slurry Seal, Inc., 216 F.R.D. 301,
304 (D.N.J.2003) ("In reviewing a Magistrate Judge's
factual determinations .. . a District Court may not
consider any evidence which was not presented to the
Magistrate Judge."). In terms of considering additional
evidence, a distinction can be drawn between review of
non-dispositive and dispositive orders:

While the Court is generally not precluded from
considering additional evidence not submitted by a
party to a magistrate judge when reviewing a report and
recommendation issued by such judge on a dispositive
motion, there is nothing in Rule 72(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure which states that it may do so
on a non-dispositive issue ....
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. CPT Med. Servs., 375
F.Supp.2d 141, 158 (E.D.N.Y.2005).
*S At least one district court in the Fourth Circuit,
however, has held that a district judge can hear new
evidence when reviewing a non-dispositive motion. See
United Stares t•. Carn 461 F.Supp.2d 478. 480 n. 2
(W.D.Va.2006) ("While review of a magistrate judge's
decision on nondispositive motions does not normally
permit the admission of evidence not considered by the
magistrate judge, the district judge has the discretion to
do so."), qfld, 597 F .3d 608 (4th Cir.2010). However,

even in instances where a district court may consider new
evidence. it is not under an obligation to do so:
While the court may receive further
evidence, attempts to introduce
new evidence after the magistrate
judge has acted are disfavored.
In appropriate cases, however,
the district court may exercise
its discretion and accept further
evidence when a party offers
sufficient reasons for so doing.
Caldwell i·. Jackson. 831 F.Supp.2d 911. 914
(M.D.N.C.2010) (citations omitted); see also Virgin
Enterprises Ltd. •·· Virgin Cuts, Inc .. 149 F.Supp.2d 220,
223 (E.D.Va.2000). This accords with Wright and Miller's
statement that '·even though there are contrary indications
in some cases, a district judge should have at least the
authority to consider further evidence in reviewing rulings
on nondispositive matters." 12 Charles Alan Wright &
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3069
(2d. ed.2013).

Based on the cases cited above, this Court decides that it
does not have the authority to consider evidence at this
stage which was not before the Magistrate. Furthermore,
even if this Court did have the discretion to consider such
evidence, it would decline to do so at this stage given the
extensive opportunities the parties have had to document
the events leading up to the filing of the motion to compel.
The Court will not consider evidence that counsel for the
Reshes called counsel for Realty Concepts on January 31,
2013, as this information was never before presented. The
Court will. however, consider evidence of the January 4,
2013, phone call because that call was a part of record
prior to the Magistrate's order granting expenses, even
though the Magistrate did not discuss this call. The Court
therefore grants the motion to strike in part.
Realty Concepts also argues that the Resheses improperly
request in their response that the Court-to the extent it
chooses to modify the previous award-now grant the full
amount sought in the affidavit, that is, $10.605.50. Realty
Concepts argues that this request is invalid because the
Reshes never filed an objection to the Magistrate's order.
Because the Court declines to grant an award in excess of
that ordered by the Magistrate, the Court need not reach
this issue, and so the remainder of the motion to strike is
denied as moot.
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must consider timely objections and
modify or set aside cmy part of the

IV. Standard of Review for
Magistrate's Order Granting Expenses
Pursuant to federal law, district court judges can empower
magistrate judges to decide certain pretrial matters:
*6 [A] judge may designate a
magistrate judge to hear and
determine any pretrial matter
pending before the court, except
a motion for injunctive relief, for
judgment on the pleadings, for
summary judgment, to dismiss or
quash an indictment or information
made by the defendant, to suppress
evidence in a criminal case, to
dismiss or to permit maintenance of
a class action, to dismiss for failure
to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, and to involuntarily
dismiss an action. A judge of the
court may reconsider any pretrial
matter under this subparagraph (A)
where it has been shown that the
magistrate judge's order is clearly
erroneous or contrary to law.

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(A). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
72(a) gives effect to Section 636(b)(l)(A), Segal v.
L. C. Holme Contractors, Inc., 303 F.Supp.2d 790, 793
(S.D.W.Va.2004), and governs a district court's review of
a magistrate's order regarding a non-dispositive matter.
That Rule states:
When a pretrial matter not
dispositive of a party's claim or
defense is referred to a magistrate
judge to hear and decide, the
magistrate judge must promptly
conduct the required proceedings
and. when appropriate, issue a
written order stating the decision. A
party may serve and file objections
to the order within 14 days after
being served with a copy. A party
may not assign as error a defect
in the order not timely objected
to. The district judge in the case

order thm is clearly erroneous or fs
comrary to law.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a) (emphasis added). This ··clear error"
standard contrasts Vvith the de novo review standard
applied to reviewof dispositivemotions. See Fed.R.Civ.P.
72(b)(3).
"A court must look to the nature of a motion rather than
its label in determining" whether the motion is dispositive
or non-dispositive. Segal, 303 F.Supp.2d at 795. The
motions listed in Section 636(b)(l )(A) are considered to
be dispositive motions, see id. at 793, and motions for
expenses incurred in filing a motion to compel are not
included on that list. Furthermore, '"motions for sanctions
are not dispositive by nature, regardless of the label.,. Id.
at 795. Therefore, the Reshes's request for expenses will
be treated as a non-dispositive motion subject to the clear
error/ contrary to law standard of Rule 72(a).
"Clearly erroneous" and "contrary to law" are not
synonyms, however. The United States Supreme Court
has explained the .:'clear error" standard:
In applying this standard, we, like any reviewing court,
will. not reverse a lower court's finding of fact simply
because we "would have decided the case differently."
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct.
1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). Rather, a reviewing court
must ask whether, "on the entire evidence," it is "left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed." United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed.
746 (1948).
*7 Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (200 I). This
standard is "deferential" and "findings of fact should
be affirmed unless the reviewing court's view of the
entire record leaves the Court with 'the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.' " Fed.
Election Comm'n v. Christian Coal., 178 F.R.D. 456, 460
(E.D.Va.1998) (quoting Harman v. Levin. 772 F.2d 1150,
1153 (4th Cir.1985)).

The "contrary to law" aspect of Rule 72(a) requires a
different level of review:
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.. When . .. review of a non-dispositive motion by a
district judge turns on a pure question of law. that
review is plenary under the ·contrary lo law· branch of
the Rule 72(a) standard.'' Po1rerslwre, Inc. r. S)mtel,
Inc., 597 F.3d 10. 15 (1st Cir.20IO) (citations omitted).
"·This means that, for questions of law, there is no
practical difference between review under Rule 72(a)'s
'contrary to law' standard and [a] de novo standard."
Id
Robinson v. Quicken Loans Inc.. No. 3: l 2-cv-0981.
2013 WL i704839, at *3 (S.D.W.Va. Apr. 19, 2013).
Therefore, the Court will review the factual portions of the
Magistrate order under the clearly erroneous standard but
will review the Magistrate's legal conclusions to detem1ine
if they are contrary to law-that is, the court will conduct
a de novo review of those conclusions.

Having explained the standard by which the Court will
review the Magistrate's order. the Court now turns to
Realty Concepts' first objection-that the Reshes did not
satisfy the meet and confer requirement of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 37.

V. The Meet and Confer Requirement
A party considering filing a motion to compel is required
under the Federal Rules to "[attempt] in good faith to
obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action"
before filing the motion to compel, or else that party
cannot receive an award for reasonable costs incurred in
filing the motion to compel. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(5)(A)(i).
The Local Rules of Civil Procedure elaborate on this so~
called meet and confer requirement:
Before filing any discovery motion,
including any motion for sanctions
or for a protective order, counsel
for each party shall make a good
faith effort to confer in person or
by telephone to narrow the areas of
disagreement to the greatest possible
extent. It shall be the responsibility
of counsel for the moving party to
arrange for the meeting.
Local R. Civ. P. 37. l(b). If the party moving to compel
fails to attempt in good faith to meet and confer before

th~ motion to compd is filed, the filing party can still
prevail on the motion to compel but cannot receive an
award for expenses incurred in bringing the motion to
compel. See Fronth!r-Kernper Constmcrors. Inc. v. Elk Run
Coal Co., Inc .. 246 F.R.D. 522. 526 (S.D. W.Va.2007). The
determination of whether the meet and confer requirement
is met is a legal conclusion that will be reviewed according
to the contrary to law standard; in other words, it wi11 be
reviewed de novo.

*8 This district has previously held that a letter on its own
does not satisfy the meet and confer requirement. Deakins
i·. Pack, No. l:10-cvl396, 2012 WL 242859~ at *10
(S.D.W.Va. Jan. 25, 2012). In another case in the Fourth
Circuit, the district court held that the meet and confer
requirement was met where the parties exchanged emails
and had a conference call '·regarding all outstanding
discovery issues" before the motion to compel was filed.
Although this call did not resolve all issues, the court
found that the meet and confer requirement was met,
noting that •·the presence of remaining issues does not
serve as the standard against which the Court determines
whether a meet-and-confer has taken place." O'Nea/ v.
Capital One Auto Fin., Inc., No. 3: 10-cv-00040, 2011 WL
3877083, at *2 (N.D.W.Va. Aug.31.2011).

(L

Realty Concept provided responses to the underlying
discovery requests on January 2, 2013. On January 4,
2013, counsel for the parties spoke via phone concerning
production. The Reshes claim that this call "was in
direct response to the deficiencies Third-Party Plaintiffs
found with the Discovery Responses and specifically
with the insufficient production of documents.'' Resp.
at 2-3. Realty Concepts insists that the phone call only
concerned document production and did not involve
Realty Concepts' written responses to the discovery
request or the types of documents provided by Realty
Concepts. Mot. Strike at 4-5. It appears that this
call lasted between five and twelve minutes. 5 Counsel
subsequently emailed each other on January 4 and 7, 2013.
On January 30. 2013, the Reshes alerted Realty Concepts
via letter that the Reshes would file a motion to compel if
Realty Concepts did not supplement their answers within
two days. Counsel for the parties exchanged emails ,lfter
the letter was received to attempt to resolve this discovery
dispute. Having not reached a solution, the Reshes filed
their motion to compel on February 1, 2013. certifying
that the Reshes had made a good faith effort to meet and
confer.
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After considering the evidence, the Magistrate ..agree[d]
with Realty Concepts that the Reshes did not comply
with the spirit of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)
(1) or the explicit language of Local Rule 37.l(b) when
they filed a motion to compel witho.ut first conducting a
meet and confer session.•, Award Order at 7. Additionally,
she noted that '"[s]ending a letter more than three weeks
after receiving the responses, which gives the adverse party
little time and opportunity to address the disagreement, is
insufficient to fulfill the meet and confer requirement.'' Id
The Magistrate did not discuss the phone call of January
4, 2013.
Despite concluding that the meet and confer requirement
was not met, the Magistrate nonetheless awarded the
Reshes some of the costs requested:
[U]nder the facts of this particular case, the Court
does not find that the Reshes' [s] failure entitles Realty
Concepts to entirely avoid an award of fees. While
it is true that the Reshes filed the motion somewhat
prematurely, they subsequently met and conferred with
Realty Concepts and put forth a good faith effort to
resolve the dispute without judicial intervention ....
*9 Taking these factors into consideration, the
undersigned finds that the exception for failure to make
a good faith effort to obtain the discovery before filing
a motion to compel does not preclude an award in this
case.
Award Order at 7-8.
Based on a plenary review of the legal conclusion that
the Reshes were entitled to reimbursement for expenses,
this Court agrees with the Magistrate and finds that
the meet and confer requirement was met. The Court
does not believe that the meet and confer requirement
is an absolute prerequisite under the facts here. While
the better practice is to have a meeting before filing
the motion to compel, here the Reshes complied with
the spirit of the requirement by conferring extensively
with Realty Concepts concerning production after filing
the motion to compel and postponing any hearing.
The discussions ultimately proved fruitful. The Reshes's
efforts are sufficient to support a determination that the
Reshes satisfied the meet and confer requirement and are
therefore entitled to fees.

Realty Concepts faults the Reshes for not filing a timely
objection to the Magistrate's finding that the Reshes did
not comply with the spirit or letter of Rule 37. Realty
Concepts argues that having not filed a formal objection,
the Reshes1s ·'attempt to rewrite the history of this dispute
cannot overcome this finding and constitutes the type
of newly-raised evidence the Court is precluded from
considering under Rule 72(a)." Reply at 4, ECF No. 185.
The Court disagrees. The Reshes's argument that they
did satisfy the meet and confer requirement is a logical
defense to the objection made by Realty Concepts. It is
nonsensical that the Reshes's response to the objection is
precluded. Furthermore, the Court granted the motion
to strike in part, and is not considering impermissible
newly-raised evidence anyway. Perhaps most importantly,
as explained above, the Court does not ,believe that the
meet and confer requirement is absolute. It therefore does
not matter whether the Reshes formally objected to the
Magistrate's finding, as a finding that the meet and confer
requirement was not literally met does not necessarily
preclude the award of expenses.

In summary, the objection regarding the meet and confer
requirement is denied.

VI. Entry of Penalty for "Resolved" Dispute
Realty Concepts also objects to the award because
Realty Concepts was allegedly completely cooperative in
resolving the motion to compel and the parties did in fact
reach a resolution of the discovery dispute on their own
prior to the hearing on April 29, 2013. Realty Concepts
claims that an award is therefore unjust under Rule 37.
Realty Concepts states that the parties resolved the
discovery dispute underlying the motion to compel during
a meeting on March 6, 2013. In accordance with the
agreement reached at the meeting, Realty Concepts
thereafter produced hundreds of pages of documents.
On April 24, 2013, Realty Concepts attempted to
confirm with the Reshes that the dispute had been
resolved. Next, "[o]n a separate discovery track, Realty
Concepts supplemented its original Responses upon
discovering newly acquired information in a mislabeled
box," which constituted a supplement ofnewly-discovered
information pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26. 6 Objections at 3. Realty Concepts faults the
Magistrate for "mak[ing] a finding that further documents

WESTLAW
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

HSBC Bank USA, Nat. Ass'n v. Resh, Not Reported in F.Supp.3d (2014)

2014 WL 317820

were needed pursuant to the premature motion to compel
as opposed to a proper Federal R ulc 26( e) supplement.
which is an analytical error.'' Objections at 8.

*10

The Reshes counter that the discovery dispute was
not resolved before the hearing on April 29, 2013, because
·'[e]ach time [Realty Concepts] certified that all documents
had been produced[,] more documents were found and
it is questionable whether [Realty Concepts] performed a
proper search for the documents in the first place.,, Resp.
at 11, ECF No. 183. The Magistrate commented on this
issue as follows:
As the undersigned stated at the
hearing, it appears as though
counsel for Realty Concepts
acted responsibly in attempting to
resolve the discovery disagreements.
In fact, all counsel expended
considerable energy in working
out the issues. Still, it cannot
be ignored that Realty Concepts's
production of relevant material was
unacceptably protracted. Therefore,
circumstances do not exist that
would make an award of expenses
unjust.
Award Order at 8.
This objection by Realty Concepts is denied, regardless
of whether the Court uses a •~contrary to law" or '"clearly
erroneous" standard of review. Although Realty Concepts
may have produced all documents underlying the motion
to compel by the time the April hearing occurred, this did
not change that fact that the Reshes found it necessary
to file and maintain a motion to compel in the first
place. It took quite a bit of time for the parties to
resolve this discovery dispute. Also, in the end, the
Magistrate did grant the motion to compel via orders
entered on Febmary 14, 2013, and April 29, 2013. ECF
Nos. 120, 153. Furthermore, the Reshes had reason to
be apprehensive about production, whether in regard to
the discovery dispute or supplemental disclosures on a
separate discovery track. If anything, Realty Concepts'
discovery of recent documents that were mislabeled on
that separate discovery track supports the Reshes's fear
that document production in other areas was problematic.
Furthermore, the Court has found no case law for the

proposition that the .. resolution" of the motion to compel
in this manner ~1akes an award unjust.

Realty Concepts argues that allowing an award in this
situation creates misplaced incentives, because Realty
Concepts would have been within its rights to wait until
after the April hearing to produce the supplemental
"mis1abe1ed'' documents, as long as production was timely
under Rule 26(e). Had Realty Concepts so waited, it
argues. the Reshes would have been unaware at the time
of the hearing that more documents had been uncovered
and would have had little reason to question production.
In essence, Realty Concepts argues that an award of fees
here penalizes Realty Concepts for acting promptly in
disclosing uncovered documents. Despite recognizing that
counsel for Realty Concepts cooperated, the Magistrate
noted that production was "unacceptably protracted" and
preceded by improper objections in the first place. Award
Order at 9. As the Magistrate concluded, this Court
likewise finds that an award of expenses is appropriate.

VII. Magistrate's "Mischaracterization"
of Recent Document Production
*11 Realty Concepts also objects on the grounds that
the Magistrate's order mischaracterizes Realty Concepts'
document production. Realty Concepts again argues that
because Realty Concepts produced some supplemental
documents pursuant to Rule 26(e) shortly before the
hearing on the motion the compel, the Magistrate became
confused and mistakenly believed that Realty Concepts
was instead providing documents responsive to the
motion to compel. The Reshes respond that this objection
is irrelevant.
Reviewing this information de novo, the Court rejects
this objection. This objection largely overlaps with the
objection discussed in the previous section. The Court
finds that this point does not dictate a finding that the
award of fees here is unjust. To the contrary, in light of
the supplemental documents produced under Rule 26(e),
the Reshes were justified in being apprehensive about the
completeness of Realty Concepts' disclosures involving
the documents underlying the motion to compel. This
objection is therefore denied.
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VIIl. Burden of Showing Entitlement to Fees
Realty Concepts argues that the Reshes have not met
their burden of proving entitlement to fees and that the
award of fees is based on mere speculation. It is true that
the Magistrate noted that the memorandum in support
of fees. ECF No. 155, '<was only four and [a] half pages
long with minimal legal citation and argument.'' Award
Order at 13. Realty Concepts argues that the award
order '"points to no evidence [from that brief] that even
attempts to satisfy [the Reshes's] burden." Objections at
12 (emphasis removed). According to Realty Concepts,
"[i]t appears the Magistrate silently found [the Reshes]
satisfied [their] burden through the latter's unfounded
speculation and paranoia." Id.
Based on the language of Rule 37, once a motion
to compel is granted, a court must require the party
whose conduct necessitated the motion to pay reasonable
expenses to the moving party. unless one of the three
exceptions is met. Therefore, once the Magistrate granted
the motion to compel, the Reshes only needed to prove
that their expenses were reasonable, not that they were
entitled to expenses in the first place. Although a subtle
distinction, it is an important once, especially since
Realty Concepts argues in a separate objection that the
evidence does not support the amount of fees awarded.
The Court will indeed assess the reasonableness of the
expenses awarded later in this Memorandum Opinion and
Order. However, upon de novo review, that Court has
no problem finding that the Reshes met their burden of
showing they were entitled to some amowzt of fees. Rule
37 presents three exceptions to this mandatory award, but
the Court finds that these exceptions do not apply. To the
extent that Realty Concepts is arguing that the motion to
compel should not have been granted, such an argument
is impermissible here and should have instead been raised
in a challenge to the order granting the motion to compel.
*12 As a side note, the Court finds no problem
with the Magistrate's characterization of the Reshes's
memorandum in support of fees as using "minimal legal
citation and argument." '"Minimal" could mean that
the party-rather than going above and beyond the
burden required-merely put forward the least amount
of argument necessary to support a finding in that
party's favor. Even more importantly, the Magistrate
made that characterization when describing the amount

of time that could be billed for completion of that
memorandum. The adjective ·'minimal" corresponded
with the amount of time spent on the memorandum rather
than the legal sufficiency of that writing. Furthermore.
that memorandum was filed after the motion to compel
was granted and therefore after the awarding of fees was
triggered. In summary, this objection is denied.

vm. Alleged Bad Faith and Good Faith of the Parties
Realty Concepts additionally argues that ..[t]he fee award
is ... unjust given the Magistrate Judge's findings with
respect to the parties' respective roles in the duration of
the discovery dispute." Objections at 13. According to
Realty Concepts, it has acted in good faith throughout
this situation. while the Reshes have acted in bad faith. As
explained previously, although the Magistrate found that
the Reshes did not comply literally with Rule 37, the Court
does not believe that the meet and confer requirement is
rigid. Furthermore, even if counsel for Realty Concepts
exhibited nothing but good faith-which the Magistrate
acknowledged-, this in itself does not necessarily mean
that an award of fees is unjust.

IX. Policy Considerations
Realty Concepts argues that certain policy considerations
"override'' the award of fees. According to Realty
Concepts, the award of fees granted by the Magistrate
"permits Third Party Plaintiffs to pretend to negotiate in
good faith, leave Realty Concepts with the understanding
that the dispute has resolved, [and] conspires [sic] to let the
latter make additional information available, then permits
the former to seek fees for actions the latter completed
voluntarily.'' Objections at 15. The Court rejects this
characterization. The record is clear that Realty Concepts
initially asserted inadequate objections and then took
months to provide relevant documents, giving the Reshes
a legitimate basis to maintain their motion to compel,
which was ultimately granted.

X. Reasonable Award of Fees and Expenses
Having rejected all of the objections regarding exceptions
to the mandatory award of fees, the Court now turns to
the last objection raised by Realty Concepts-namely, that
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the amount of the fct!s award should be:: reconsidered. A

de novo review of the Magistrate's determination of the
award of fees is appropriate here.
In the sct:on<l order granting the motion to compel,
the Reshes were directed a file an affidavit of fees and
argument supporting the award. specifically referring to
the factors found in Robinson r. Equ{{ax Information
7

Senices, LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 243-44 (4th Cir.2009).
ECF No. 153. As explained in Robinson. "[i]n calculating
an award of attorney's fees, a court must first determine
a lodestar figure by multiplying the number of reasonable
hours expended times a reasonable rate." Id at 243
(citing Grissom v. The Mills Corp.. 549 F.3d 313,320 (4th
Cir.2008)). Great attention should especially be paid to the
hourly rate:

*13 As in this case, determination of the hourly
rate will generally be the critical inquiry in setting
the "reasonable fee," and the burden rests with the
fee applicant to establish the reasonableness of a
requested rate. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 89596 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547-48 n. l I, 79 L.Ed.2d
891 (1984). In addition to the attorney's own affidavits,
the fee applicant must produce satisfactory ·'specific
evidence of the 'prevailing market rates in the relevant
community' for the type of work for which he seeks an
award." Spe/11•. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1402 (4th
Cir.1987) (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 895, 104 S.Ct. at
1547).
Plyler v. Evatt, 902 F.2d 273,277 (4th Cir.1990).
In Robinson, the counsel requesting fees produced billing
records and an affidavit from lead counsel, and pointed
to evidence from an official "matrix" reflecting reasonable
attorney rates. 8 The Fourth Circuit found that the
district court below abused its discretion by giving an
award "in the absence of ·satisfactory specific evidence
of the prevaiJing market rates.' ·• Id. at 245 (quoting
Plyler, 902 F.2d at 277). In making this finding, the

Fourth Circuit noted that counsel did not include any
atlidavits from other local lawyers and that the .. matrix"
did not adequately retlect rates in that region. Because
lead counsel's --amdavit. standing alone, is not sutlicient
evidence of the prevailing market rates," the Fourth
Circuit remanded to the district court to determine
the fee after considering additional evidence. Id at
246. The Reshes suggest that although they could have
theoretically submitted supporting affidavits with their
reply memorandum. they were prevented from doing so
because the Magistrate ruled on the award before the
deadline to file a reply expired.

The award of expenses here was thoroughly considered
by the Magistrate, who substantially reduced the amount
sought. The rates and nature of the work were fairly
considered. Under these circumstances, there is no
need for more time-consuming and costly submissions
concerning the matter of fees. Upon review. the Court
finds that the Reshes are entitled to an award of $4,297.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Realty Concepts' motion
to strike (ECF No. 184) is GRANTED in pa~ Realty
Concepts' objections (ECF No. 172) are DENIED, and the
Magistrate's Memorandum Opinion and Order (ECF No.
168) is AFFIRMED. The Court FINDS that Third Party
Plaintiffs the Reshes are entitled to an award of $4,297.
The Court accordingly LIFTS the stay previously granted
in this matter (ECF No. 173).
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this
written Opinion and Order to counsel of record and any
unrepresented parties.

All Citations
Not Reported in F.Supp.3d, 2014 WL 317820

Footnotes

1

General objections are those that are not "stated with specificity," such as "a general objection on vagueness, ambiguity,
broadness, and excessive burden without more." Hager v. Graham, 267 F.R.D. 486,492 (N.D.W.Va.2010).

2

Realty Concepts argued in response to the request for fees that its objections to the request for documents were
substantially justified, which would preclude an award of fees and expenses. ECF No. 166 at 12-13. However, Realty
Concept does not make this argument in the pending objections.

3

The "meet and confer'' obligation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 is explained in Section V.
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As more fully explained in Section IV, a non-dispositive order is an order which is not "a deciding factor" and does not
"[bring] about a final determination" of the underlying relief sought in the case. Black's Law Dictionary, "Dispositive" (9th
ed.2009). An order resolving a motion to compel is non-dispositive, in contrast to an order resolving a motion for summary
judgment or an order resolving a motion to dismiss.
Realty Concepts states that the call lasted no more than five minutes, Mot. Strike at 5, while the Itemized Invoice of
Expenses submitted by counsel for the Rashes has counsel billing 12 minutes for that phone call.
A party who has made a disclosure under Rule 26(a)--or who has responded to an interrogatory, request for production,
or request for admission-must supplement or correct its disclosure or response ... in a timely manner if the party
learns that in some material respect the disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect, and if the additional or
corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing[.]
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e)(1 )(A).
The twelve factors that should guide the Court when considering a reasonable award of fees: are: "( 1) the time and labor
expended; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised; (3) the skill required to properly perform the legal services
rendered; (4) the attorney's opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation; (5) the customary fee for like work; (6) the
attorney's expectations at the outset of the litigation; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8)
the amount in controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney; (10) the
undesirability of the case within the legal community in which the suit arose; ( 11) the nature and length of the professional
relationship between attorney and client; and (12) attorneys' fees awards in similar cases." Id. at 243--44 (citation omitted).
The so-called "Laffey Matrix" is "an official statement of market-supported reasonable attorney fee rates which was
adopted, and is periodically updated, by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia." Id. at 244.

End of Document
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

time of the incidents alleged in the complaint. Plaintiff
also seeks production of documents responsive to her
request for production nos. l and 4. which essentially
seeks discovery of defendant's entire file concerning
plaintiff, including all documents related Lo defendant's
attempt to collect the debt, all correspondence between the
parties. collector's notes, audio recordings. and documents
reflecting the contacts between defendant and plaintiff.
Defendant objected to interrogatory no. 2 as overly broad
and irrelevant~ as plaintiff has not asserted any claims
concerning her obligation to pay the underlying debt.
Defendant produced, or agreed to produce, collector's
notes and audio recordings but objected to the remainder
of document request nos. l and 4, on the grounds
that it was vague. overly broad, and sought discovery
of documents beyond the scope of the issues in this
case. After a perfunctory exchange of e-mails between
counsel, plaintiff filed her discovery motion. In response
to the motion, defendant asserts that plaintiff has not
satisfied her obligation to meet and confer concerning
the discovery dispute before filing a motion and. on the
substance of the dispute, argues that the information
sought is irrelevant to the claims and defenses in this case.
The court has determined that oral argument will not be
helpful in resolving this dispute. See W.D. MICH. LCIVR
7.3(d).

JOSEPH G. SCOVILLE, United States Magistrate Judge.

*1 This is an action for damages brought against
an alleged debt collector under the Federal Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1692-1692p, and analogous state law. Plaintiffs
complaint involves defendant's efforts to collect allegedly
past-due amounts on a Visa credit card account. Plaintiff
alleges violation of the FDCPA arising from defendant's
failure to afford plaintiff thirty days to dispute the debt
or demand verification of it, as required by 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692g(a), and by demanding plaintiff pay off the debt
within twenty-four hours of defendant's initial contact.
Plaintiff also alleges that defendant misled plaintiff as to
her rights not to be contacted at work and failed to provide
written validation of the debt. as required by the FDCPA.
Presentiy pending before the court is piaintifrs motion
to compel discovery. Plaintiff seeks an answer to
interrogatory no. 2, which asked for the name of
the obligor and the amount of the debt (including a
breakdown between principal, interest~ fees and other
charges) which defendant was attempting to collect at the

A. Meet-and-Confer Obligation
Both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this court's
Local Rules require a party seeking to compel discovery
to confer in good faith with the opposing party as a
prerequisite to seeking court intervention. Fed.R.Civ.P.
37(a)(l) requires that a discovery motion "must include a
certification that the movant has in good faith conferred
or attempted to confer with the person or party failing
to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it
without court action." This court's Local Rules flesh out
the meet-and-confer obligation. The rules provide that, in
the case of all discovery motions, counsel involved in the
discovery dispute "shall confer in person or by telephone
in a good-faith effort to resolve each specific discovery
dispute." W.D. MICH. LCIVR 7.l(d). The penalty for
failing tc fulfill this obligation i~ that a prevailing party
otherwise entitled to fees and expenses forfeits this right.
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(i).
*2 The efforts by plaintifrs counsel to fulfill the meetand-confer obligation of the rules consist of an exchange
of e-mails between counsel. (ID # s 85-89). Plaintiffs

WESTLAW
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

McWatters v. Cherry Creek Strategic Advisory, LLC, Not Reported in F.Supp.3d (2014)
2014 WL 295TT39

efforts meet neither the form nor the substance required
by the rules. First, counsel never attempted to confer ••in
person or by telephone" as required by W.D. MICH.
LCIVR 7. l(d). An exchange of curt e-mails is almost
never successful in resolving discovery disputes. For
precisely this reason, the court requires counsel to engage
each other on a personal level. Although a preliminary
exchange of e-mails may be useful in identifying the issues,
a moving party does not satisfy Local Rule 7.l(d) unless
and until he attempts to speak to opposing counsel.
The substance of plaintiff's efforts was likewise lacking.
Defense counsel made it clear that she thought certain
discovery requests sought irrelevant information. Defense
counsel's e-mail asked plainti.frs counsel "to explain how
these documents are relevant to the claims pied in your
client's complaint." (ID# 89). Counsel committed to
reconsider her position if plaintiffs counsel provided
a satisfactory explanation. (Id). Plaintiff's counsel
responded as follows: '"The Rules of Federal Procedure
do not require me. to satisfy you that my requests are
relevant. You are not the judge in this case but I do
plan on filing a motion so you can explain your position
to the court." (ID# 87). Counsel's failure to engage the
substance of defendant's objection is precisely the type of
obstinate conduct that the rules seek to discourage. When
faced with an objection to relevance, an interrogating
party most certainly does have the obligation to make his
case of relevance to opposing counsel before presenting
the argument to the court. When defense counsel
persisted, plaintiffs counsel repeated that he had "no
duty to explain relevancy to you as that is no basis
for any objection to discovery." Plaintiff's counsel
contended that defendant's interpretation of the meetand-confer provisions was "strained." (ID# 86). To the
contrary, plaintiffs counsel completely misunderstands
his obligation under this court's Rules. A good-faith effort
to resolve a discovery dispute requires precisely the kind
of substantive discussion invited by defense counsel.
Perfunctory demands for capitulation followed by a
steadfast refusal to discuss the substance of a discovery
dispute falls far short of compliance with counsel's
obligation to meet and confer "in good faith" to resolve
discovery disputes. Plaintiffs counsel has not complied
with the meet-and-confer obligation, and the sanction of
Rule 37(a)(5) applies.

Rule 26(b )( l) allows a party to obtain discovery regarding
any nonprivileged matter that is .. relevant to any party's
claim or defense." Despite recent narrowing of the scope
of discovery as a result of amendments to Rule 26,
the rule continues to provide that relevant information
•·need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery
appears r~asonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence." FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(l).
The principal dispute between the parties concerns the
discoverability under this rule of certain information
requested by plaintiff.
*3 Interrog-d.tory no. 2 requests basic information about
the debt that defendant was attempting to collect when
the alleged violations of the FDCl>A occurred. The
information requested includes only the identity of the
creditor, the amount of the debt, and a breakdown of
principal, interest and fees. Defendant has objected to the
production of this basic information, on the contention
that it is irrelevant, because plaintiff has not contested her
obligation to pay the debt. Defendant's view of relevance
is unreasonably narrow. In any case brought under the
FDCPA, discovery of the debt collector's underlying file,
including evidence of the existence and the amount of
the debt, collector's notes, and communications with the
debtor, would be appropriate as such basic information
is "relevant" to the claims and defenses. In the present
case, such basic information is especially relevant, as one
of plaintifrs claims is that defendant never sent plaintiff
a written notice validating the debt, that is, setting forth
the amount of the debt and the name of the creditor to
whom the debt was owed, as required by 15 U.S.C. §
1692g. Clearly, the information in the debt collector's file
concerning debt validation is central to such a claim. If, for
example, discovery shows that the debt collector did not
know the amount of the debt or the name of the creditor
at the time the debt collector acted, plaintifrs claim under
section 1692g is strengthened. Evidence is "relevant" if it
has "any tendency" to make a fact more or less probable
than it would be without the evidence. FED.R.EVID.
401 (a). This is not a strenuous test, and it is easily met by
plaintiff in this case. The court will therefore compel an
answer to interrogatory no. 2.
Defendant objects to certain portions of document request
no. 1. Subsection (a), which calls for "all documents
related to defendant's attempt to collect the debt from
the plaintiff' is objected to as overly broad and vague.
This objection is itself overly broad and vague. There is

B. Discovery Dispute
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nothing imprecise about asking for documents relating to
defendant's collection attempts \liith regard to a particular
debtor. Presumably, defendant maintains a paper or
electronic file relating to the particular debt allegedly owed
by plaintiff. Again, discovery of the debt collectorts file is
reasonable and to be expected in a case of this nature. See
Patrick 1·. PHH A·fort. Corp., No. 3:12-cv-39, 298 F.R.D.
333. 2014 WL 296930 at * 5 (N.D.W.Va. Jan.17. 2014)
(ordering production of entire mortgage file in FDCPA
case). If relevant for no other reason, the debt collector's
file wilt bear on the bona fide error defense (Answer,
docket# 8, Second Aff. Def.), as the defense focuses on
the facts known to the debt collector when it acted. See
Jerman v. Carlisle, lvfcNelli, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, P. C.,
559 U.S. 573, 130 S.Ct. 1605, 176 L.Ed.2d 519 (2010). The
objection to request no. l(a) is overruled.
Request no. l(b) seeks all correspondence between the
parties. Defendant evades the request by indicating that
it sent an •'initial collection letter" to plaintiff and that
plaintiff has a copy of the letter. Plaintiff however
'
'
disputes that a letter was ever sent. The allegation
that the opponent already has a copy of a disputed
piece of evidence does nothing to satisfy the responding
party's discovery obligation. Defendant will be required
to produce copies of all correspondence between plaintiff
and defendant, whether or not defendant thinks that
plaintiff has a copy of the correspondence already. The
remainder of request no. 1 appears to have been complied
with by defendant.
*4
Finally, document request no. 4 seeks
invoices, ledgers, promissory notes, security agreements,
assignment documents. and other documents related to
the debt. Defendant objected to request no. 4 as ·•overly
End of Document

broad'' and also on grounds of relevance. The request
is not overly broad. as it is focused on the debt at
issue. Nor is the request irrelevant. If defendant had no
proof whatsoever that a debt was owing from plaintiff
lo a creditor, and no interest in collecting the debt, then
any collection effort might well be deemed -~unfair or
unconscionable." 15 U.S.C. ~ 1692f. Documents tending
to show the extent of the debt collector's interest in
the account are discoverable in a FDCPA case. See
A11dzo11do \'. And~rsun. Crenshall' & Assoc.. LLC, 256
F.R.D. 661. 667 (D.N.M.2009). Again, plaintiff seeks only
information relevant to the debt at issue in the present
case. As plaintiff points out, the underlying file will tend to
throw light on the question whether this was a consumer
debt falling within the scope of the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692a(5). If the underlying documents show that a debt
was generated in connection with a business transaction,
plaintiffs claim fails. The documents, depending on what
they show, could lead to relevant evidence. The fact that
defendant, as a mere debt collector, may not have such
documents in its file is not grounds for an objection. A
party is only required to produce documents that are
within its possession, custody or control. FED. R. CIV.
P. 34(a)(1). If defendant does not have the requested
documents within its possession, custody or control, it
should just say so, and that will be the end of the matter.
An order will be entered granting plaintiffs motion to
compel, but denying her request for costs and attorney's
fees.
~

All Citations
Not Reported in F.Supp.3d, 2014 WL 2957739
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2015 WL 51m99 (Utah Dist.Ct.) (Trial Order)
District Court of Utah.
Thi.rd Judicial District
Summit County
Tom N. PITCHER, Plaintiff,
V.

ISCHOOL CAMPUS, LLC, et al, Defendants.

No.130500597.
July 7, 2015.
Roling and Order on iSchool Attorney Fees and Motion to Strike

Kara Pettit, Judge.

*l Before the Court is the iSchool Defendants' Declaration of Attorney Fees, filed May 20, 2015. Plaintiff filed an
Amended Memorandum Opposing iSchool's Attorney's Fees Affidavit on June 4, 2015 and the iSchool Defendants filed
a Reply and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Amended Memorandum Opposing iSchool's Attorney Fee Affidavit on June
5, 2015 ("Fees Opposition"). Plaintiff did not file an opposition to the Motion to Strike, and the time for doing so
has now expired. Plaintiff requested oral argument on iSchool's request for fees, but the Court finds that the issues are
straightforward and oral argument would not materially assist the Court in deciding them.
In his Fees Opposition, Plaintiff requests the Court vacate its May 18, 2015 order awarding fees. The Court declines
to vacate its award of fees. Plaintiff did not file a motion requesting any particular relief as required by Rule 7(b)(l),
and Plaintiffs Fees Opposition similarly lacks citation to the Rule upon which Plaintiffs informal request to vacate the
fees award was grounded. See Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24, ,i 8, 135 P.3d 861 ("Hereafter, when a party seeks relief from
a judgment, it must turn to the rules to determine whether relief exists, and if so, direct the court to the specific relief
available. Parties can no longer leave this task to the court by filing so-called motions to reconsider and relying upon
district courts to construe the motions within the rules.")
Nevertheless, the Court will briefly address Plaintifrs arguments. Plaintiff asserts that "the Court erred in awarding fees
and should vacate its prior order." Fees Opposition at 6. Plaintiffs argument is premised on his assertion that "there
was a dispute" and Plaintiff "met and conferred" as required by Rule 4-502. Id at 4-5. Plaintiff submitted emails dated
between April 28, 2015 at 6:10 pm and April 30, 2015 at 4:45 pm as support for the assertion that Rule 4-502's meet and
confer requirement was met. First, the emails present the same information that was provided to the Court in the parties'
submissions leading up to the May 20, 2015 Order Awarding Fees. The Court was aware that Plaintiff had communicated
with Defendants regarding the number of deposition hours. As Plaintiff stated in his Statement of Discovery Issue:

vJ

Some Defendants have indicated that they would "consider" providing Plaintiff with unspecified
additional time only if Plaintiff identified the fact witnesses Plaintiff sought to depose, which Plaintiff
did prior to filing this Statement, but have indicated that 15 hours ofadditional time is more than they
are willing to provide. Since identifying the witnesses in question, Defendants have not responded nor
indicated how much more deposition time (if any) they are willing to provide Plaintiff.

SODI at 2.
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Moreover. iSchool's submissions provided additional information to the Court regarding any meet and confer process.
or the lack thereof~ that occurred prior to Plaintiff filing his SODI on May L 2015. See e.g. iSchool's Statement
In Opposition To Plaintiffs SODI Requesting A Clarification Of Deposition Time, filed May 6, 2015 and iSchool's
Opposition to PlaintitTs Withdrawal of Stakment of Discovery Issues, filed May 13, 2015. Thus, even though the emails
themselves were not before the Court on May 20, 2015 when it issued a fees award, contrary to Plaintiffs assertion, the
Court had an objective basis upon which to determine whether Plaintiff complied with his meet and confer obligations.

*2 Second, the meet and confer obligation set forth in Rule 4-502 requires more than an exchange of emails. It expressly
requires counsel to "[m]eet and confer regarding the issues. in person or by telephone." UCJA 4-502(2)(A). From the
information presented to the Court. an initial discussion of Plaintifl's position that he had 60 hours of deposition
time occurred in person at a deposition, followed by an exchange of emails in which Defendants requested additional
information as to Plaintifl's request for additional time. Defendants said: "we are willing to consider a reasonable number
of additional hours if they are needed but 15 seems too many. We cannot, however, really respond to your request without
some identification of what additional depositions you want to take so we join in Brent's request that you identify the
additional depositions and how much time each will take.'' Savage Email dated April 29, 2015 at 3:26pm. On April 30,
2015 at 4:45 pm, Plaintifl's counsel provided a list of deponents by email, but no estimate of how much time each would
take. Instead of contacting defense counsel by phone to discuss the issues to see if resolution could be reached as required
by the Rule, the next day Plaintiff filed his SODI before any Defendants had responded to the April 30th email.
Plaintiff later withdrew his SODI stating that two depositions had been canceled and ·•counsel for the parties have
negotiated a process for scheduling the remaining depositions that is acceptable to Plaintifr' and therefore. the relief
requested by the SODI was no longer necessary. Amended Notice o/Witlzdrawa/filed May 13, 2015. Defendants opposed
the withdrawal until the Court considered their fees request because Plaintiff failed to properly meet and confer and filed
a premature SODI, causing Defendants to incur fees in opposing the SODI.
The Court agreed that an award of fees was appropriate due to Plaintiffs failure to meet and confer as required by Rule
4-502. See Utah R. Civ. P. 37(a)(7)(K) (court may award "fees incurred on account of the statement of discovery issues
if the relief requested is granted or denied, or if a party provides discovery or withdraws a discovery request after a
statement of discovery issues is filed and if the court finds that the party, witness, or attorney did not act in good faith
or asserted a position that was not substantially justified.") The Court clarifies that the basis for its award of fees is Rule
37(a)(7)(K) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Court finds that Plaintiff did not act in good faith in filing the
SODI before conducting a proper meet and confer that ultimately lead to resolution of the issue.
As for the amount of the fees award, the Court has carefully reviewed and considered the parties' submissions in this
regard and determines the reasonable fees, considering the factors required by Utah law:
1. What legal work was actually performed?
2. How much of the work performed was reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the matter?
3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the rates customarily charged in the locality for similar services?
4. Are there circumstances which require consideration of additional factors, including those llsted m the Code ot
Professional Responsibility? (The appropriateness of the work actually performed and of the attorney's billing rate is
evaluated before a reasonable fee is set. See Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d at 624-25.)
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988).
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Defendants have submitted billing records that demonstrate the work actually performed. Plaintiff does not object to
the billing rates, and the Court finds they are consistent with the rates customarily charged in the locality for similar
services by attorneys with similar experience levels. Plaintiff objects to the amount of fees requested as excessive and
unreasonable because: 1) some of the work does not pertain to drafting an opposition to the SODI, and the opposition
itself was a simple document that did not require over 14 hours of time to prepare at $600/hour. The Court agrees that
the fees amount requested includes work that was not related to the SODI and seeks an award that is more than what
W'clS reasonable and necessary to respond to the SODI.
*3 Specifically, the Court finds that the following work was reasonable and necessary to respond to the SODI:
• All of the work performed by Shaunda McNeill in drafting the opposition to the SODI, including research, and
responding to the notice seeking to withdraw the SODI; 5/4/15 to 5/13/15 6.6 hours x $210 = $1,650.
• The 5/1/15 and 5/6/15 billing entries of Mr. Hatch are block billed, and the time he spent reviewing and editing the
opposition memoranda is not itemized, but is lumped together with time spent meeting and conferring after the SODI was
filed. The Court finds that the time spent meeting and conferring is not a part of the time required to be spent responding
to the SODI, but presumably should have been spent before any SODI was filed. The Court's intention in the fees award
is to only award the fees unnecessarily incurred by Defendants because the SODI was filed prematurely, before a proper
meet and confer was conducted. The Court finds that of the 5.50 hours billed by Mr. Hatch on 5/1/15 and 5/6/15, 1.5
hours is a reasonable amount oftime for Mr. Hatch to have spent reviewing and editing Ms. McNeill's work. In addition,
the Court finds that the work performed by Mr. Hatch on 5/12/15-1 hour spent on SODI filing-and 5/13/15-1 hour
spent editing opposition to SOOT withdrawals-was reasonable and necessary. Therefore, the Court finds that 3.5 hours
of work at $600 = $2,100 was the total amount oftime reasonably necessary for Mr. Hatch to respond to the SODI.
• Therefore, the total amount of the fees that the Court finds were incurred, and were reasonable and necessary to respond
to the SODI is $3,750.
The iSchool Defendants are hereby awarded fees in the ·amount of$3,750 against Plaintiff.

This is the order of the court, and no additional order is required to be prepared.
DATED this 7 th day of July, 2015.
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
<<signature>>
Judge Kara Pettit

End
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incurred in opposing this motion. including attorneys'
fees. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(4)(ffl.
KeyCite Yellow Flag~ Negative Treatment
Distinguished by
U.S. Bancorp Equipment Finance, Inc. v. Babylon
Transit. Inc.,

E.D.N.Y.,
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United States District Court, S.D. New York.

PRESCIENT PARTNERSi L.P., Plaintiff,
V.

FIELDCREST CANNON, INC., Fieldcrest Cannon
Sure Fit, Inc., UTC Holdings, Inc., and Bert
Shlensky, Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs,
V.

Paula Riley, Third-Party Defendant.
No. 96 Civ. 759o(DAB)JCF.

I
Feb. 18, 1998.

Attorneys and Law Firms
Ned W. Branthover, Kathryn Diaz. Morgan & Finnegan,
LLP, New York City, Albert P. Allen, Michael D. McCoy,
Alston & Bird LLP, Charlotte, NC, Theresa M. Gillis,
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, New York City, Brigitte
Duffy, Joseph P. McConnell, Morgan, Brown & Joy,
Boston, MA.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
FRANCIS, Magistrate J.
*1 The plaintiff PRescient Partners and third party
defendant Paula Riley (collectively, "PRescient") move
for an order under Rule 37(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure compelling the defendants Fieldcrest Cannon,
Inc., Fieldcrest Cannon Sure Fit, Inc., UTC Holdings,
Inc., and Bert Shlensky (collectively, the "defendants")
to produce various documents and objects requested by
PRescient in its first and second requests for production of
documents. PRescient also requests an award of attorneys'
fees and costs in connection with bringing this motion. In
response, the defendants argue that the movants failed to
confer with them before filing this motion as required by
Rule 37(a). See Fcd.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(2)(8). The defendants
further request an award of their reasonable expenses

In a letter supplementing this motion, PRescient also
requests an extension of time to subpoena a witness for
a deposition. Letter from Ned Branthovc:r <lated Dec.
3. 1997, at 3. For the reasons that follow. the motion
to compel and the movants' request for attorneys' fees
and costs are denied, the defendants' request for costs is
denied, and PRescient's request for an extension of time
to serve the subpoena is denied.

Background
PRescient owns a patent for a device that stabilizes
slipcovers on upholstered furniture. On October 7, 1996,
PRescient commenced this action alleging, among other
claims, that the defendants infringed the patent and
conducted false patent marking when they sold a similar
device with their Sure Fit slipcovers and marketed the
device as the defendants' "new patented stayput." On
October 29, 1996, the defendants filed their answer, along
with counterclaims and a Third-Party Complaint against
Paula Riley, PRescienfs principal.
PRescient served its first request for production of
documents on November 4, 1996, and the defendants
served their answer on December 11, 1996. Plaintiffs First
Request for Production of Documents and Things to
Defendants Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc.; Fieldcrest Cannon
Sure Fit, Inc. and Bert Schlensky, attached as Exh.
I to Declaration of Kathryn E. Diaz in Support of
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Defendants to Produce
Documents in Response to Plaintiffs First and Second
Requests, dated October 31. 1997 ("Diaz Deel."); Answer
to Plaintiffs First Request for Production, attached as
Exh. 3 to Diaz Deel. PRescient served its second request
for production on July 31, 1997, and the defendants
served their answer on October 13, 1997. Plain tiffs Second
Request for Production of Documents and Things to
Defendants Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc., Fieldcrest Cannon
Sure Fit, Inc .. and Bert Schlensky, attached as Exh. 2 to
Diaz Deel.; Response to Plaintiffs Second Request for
Production, attached a;; Exh. 26 to Diaz Deel. After a
pretrial conference on October 16, 1997, PRescient filed
its motion to compel on October 31, 1997.
*2 On November 18, i997, I denied PRescient's request
to enforce a subpoena on Federated Department Stores,
Inc. r•Federated") and its subsidiary Macy's East, Inc.
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(.. Macy's) because the companies represented that (a) they
lacked documents responsive to the subpoena as modified
by agreement and (b) the only witness with knowledge
no longer worked for Federated or its affiliates. Order
dated Nov. 18, 1997. Discovery closed on November 28,
1997. On December 1, 1997. the defendants produced
what appears to be Macy's marketing material advertising
Sure Fit slipcovers with '"new patented stayputs.,, Letter
from Ned Branthover dated Dec. 3. 1997, at 3 & Exhs. A,
D. This indicated that Federated may have had material
responsive to the subpoena, thereby undercutting the
rationale for my November 18th denial of PRescient's
request to enforce the subpoena. In light of these
documents, PRescient now requests an extension of time
to subpoena Loretta Grolier, who is said to be a former
Macy's buyer with relevant knowledge. Letter from Ned
Branthover dated Dec. 3, 1997, at 3.

Discussion

A. Motion to Compel
PRescient claims that through depositions and other
sources, it learned of twenty-three categories of items
responsive to its first and second requests for production
that the defendants did not produce. See Diaz. Deel.
at 4-10. The items fall into five broad groupings: (1)
physical samples of Sure Fit slipcover packages featuring
the allegedly infringing stayputs and physical samples of
stayput packages the defendants allegedly intended to sell
separately from the slipcovers, (2) marketing materials
mentioning stayputs, (3) meeting agendas, minutes,
correspondence, and files kept by specified employees of
the defendants, as well as computer databases related to
PRescient or stayputs, (4) Sure Fit corporate organization
charts for 1995, and (5) document retention or destruction
programs for the defendant Fieldcrest Cannon. PRescient
claims that the defendants failed to comply with Rules 34
and 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by not
producing all responsive items and by not supplementing
its prior productions. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e) and 34.

~

In response, the defendants argue that some listed
items are not responsive to any previous request for
production, some requested documents are privileged,
PRescient's requests are overly broad and burdensome,
and all responsive documents have been produced from its
files and computers. Defendants' Response to Plaintifrs
Motion to Compel ("Defendants' Response") at 2-6. The
defendants also argue that PRescient failed to confer

with them in an attempt to resolve this discovery dispute
without court action, a prerequisite to filing a motion
to compel. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(2)(8). I find that
PRescient did fail to fulfill this prerequisite and thus do
not address the defendants' other arguments.

l. The Meet-and-Confer Requirement
Under Rule 37(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure~ a motion to compel must include "a
certification that the movant has in good faith conferred
or attempted to confer with the person or party failing to
make the discovery in an effort to secure the information
or material without court action .... " Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(2)
(B). A conclusory statement in an affidavit asserting that
the movant fulfilled the meet-and-confer requirement is
insufficient. Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. v. Unger, 171 F.R.D.
94, 99 (S.D.N.Y.1997). Rather, the movant must detail the
efforts to confer and explain why they proved fruitless.
See id; Ballou v. University of Kansas Medical Center. l 59
F.R.D. 558, 559-60 (D.Kan.1994). A "live exchange of
ideas and opinions" is required. Soto v. City of Concord,
162 F.R.D. 603, 623 (N.D.Cal.1995). The meet-andconfer requirement mandates that parties actually
*3 meet, in person or by telephone,
and make a genuine effort to resolve
the dispute by determining ... what
the requesting party is actually
seeking; what the discovering party
is reasonably capable of producing
that is responsive to the request; and
what specific genuine issues, if any,
cannot be resolved without judicial
intervention.
Deckon v. Chidebere, No. 93 Civ. 7845, 1994 WL 494885,
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.9, 1994) see also Tri-Star Pictures,
171 F.R.D. at 99.

Courts have excused the failure to meet-and-confer
where temporal exigencies required speedy action and
where efforts at informal compromise would have been
clearly futile. See Reidy v. Runyan, 169 F.R.D. 486,
490 (E. D. N. Y .1997) (excusing failure to confer because
compromise was unlikely given defendant's history of
noncompliance with court orders); Matsushita Electric
Corporation v. 212 Copiers Corp .. No. 93 Civ. 3243, 1996
WL 87245 at *l (S.D.N.Y. Feb.29. 1996) (conference
would be futile in bitter litigation which included
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contempt citations directing the jailing of some defendants
for noncompliance with court orders): In re NA SD A 0
Afo.rket-/1,/akers Amitrust litigation. No. 94 Civ. 3996.
1996 WL 187409 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.18.1996} (excusing
failure to confer in part because of imminence of deadlines
for filing papers relating to class certification motion).
Under ordinary circumstances however, the failure to
meet and confer mandates denial of a motion to compel.
Schick 1-·. Fragin. Nos. 96 B 42902, 96 B 43969. 96/9218A.
1997 WL 465217 at *3 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. Aug.12.1997).

2. Movants' Efforts
In her declaration. PRescient's counsel states. "'[W]e have
conferred in good faith with Defendants in an effort
to resolve the issues raised in the motion without court
action:· Diaz Deel. if 3. In its reply brief, PRescient claims
that

[t]hroughout the discovery periodduring the inspection of documents
and things, on and off the record
during depositions, through inperson and telephone conferences
with Defendants' counsel. and
through correspondence-Plaintiff
has sought this material. None of the
missing items brought to the Court's
attention in Plaintiffs brief are a
surprise to Defendants.
Plaintiffs Reply in Support of Its Motion to Compel
("Plaintifrs Reply") at 2. In response, the defendants
assert that PRescient never requested the items sought
to be compelled, except that an August 19, 1997 letter
generally requested a search of computer files and
chronological files. Defendant's Response at 2 n. l.
The August 19th letter simply requests the production of
items. Letter from Ned Branthover to Michael McCoy
dated Aug. 19, 1997. attached as Exh. 23 to Diaz Deel. It
neither states PRescient's plans to file a motion to compel
in the event of non-production nor otherwise indicates
that the letter was intended to be an act of conferring in
accordance with Rule 37(a). Thus, it does not satisfy the
duty to confer. See Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 622-23 ("Sending
a letter ... demanding compliance with a discovery request
is not what this Court regards as an earnest attempt to
'meet and confer on the issues."); Ballou, 159 F.R.D.

a! 559--W !_"Ont~ letter ... does not satisfy the duty to
confer."').

*4 There is evidence that during various depositions,
PRescient expressed general concerns that Sure Fit was
not producing all documents responsive to the document
requests. Letter from Kathryn Diaz to Albert Allan
dated July 28, 1997, attached as Exh. 20 to Diaz Deel.
(general concerns expressed during depositionst Letter
from Kathryn Diaz to Albert Allan dated July 31. 1997,
attached as Exh. 22 to Diaz Deel. (during deposition,
PRescient expressed concerns that relevant documents
contained in computer files were not produced). A letter
from defendants' counsel suggests that the defendants
responded to these concerns by stating that all responsive
documents were already produced. Letter from Albert
Allan to Ned Branthovet dated August 22. 1997. attached
as Exh. 24 to Diaz Deel. (·· As I stated prior to
Ms. Kramer's deposition ... , we have searched for and
produced the documents responsive to your requests.,.)_

As reflected by these letters. these conversations during
depositions do not satisfy the requirements of Rule
37(a)(2)(B). PRescient has not shown that the parties
specifically discussed the twenty-three categories of items
it seeks to have compelled, let alone shown that any
negotiations that occurred were a good faith effort to
resolve the dispute without court action. To satisfy the
meet-and-confer requirement, PRescient had to provide
an account of a "live exchange of ideas and opinions,"
including details such as the positions taken by each
side, the extent to which the parties compromised their
positions, and why the negotiations proved fruitless. See,
e.g.. Tri-Star Pictures, 171 F.R.D. at 99.
PRescient thus fails to fulfill the meet-and-confer
prerequisite to a motion to compel. This failure is not
excusable due to temporal exigencies or because efforts
at informal compromise would have been clearly futile.
Accordingly, the motion to compel is denied, along with
PRescient's request for an award of attorneys fees and
costs in bringing this motion.

B. Defendants' Request for Costs
The defendants request an award of their reasonable
expenses incurred in opposing this motion, including
attorneys' foes. Ruh~ 37(a)(4)(B) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that if a motion to compel is
denied, the court
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shall, after affording an opportunity
to be heard, require the moving
party or the attorney filing the
motion or both of them to pay to
the party ... who opposed the motion
the reasonable expenses incurred
in opposing the motion. including
attorney's fees, unless the court finds
that the making of the motion was
substantially justified or that other
circumstances make an award of
expenses unjust.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(4)(B) Because the merits of
PRescient's application have yet to be reached, it cannot
be determined whether its position was substantially
justified. In the event that the parties fail to resolve the
dispute through informal conference and the motion to
compel is resubmitted, I will reconsider the defendants'
motion for costs and attorneys' fees.

I, 1997 production. On December 3, 1997 ~ PRescient
informed the Court that its process server had made
several unsuccessful attempts to serve a subpoena on
Loretta Groller, who it believes was the Macy's buyer
when the store bought Sure Fit slipcovers using the
allegedly infringing stayputs, and who appeared to be
avoiding sen-ice. Letter from Ned Branthover dated Dec.
3, 1997, at 3. More than 60 days have passed since
PRescient began attempting to serve Ms. Groller. This
was an ample period in which to effect service, and I
will therefore not grant any additional time to serve the
subpoena.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, PRescient's motion to
compel, its request for attorneys' fees and costs, and its
request for an ex.tension of time to serve a subpoena on
Ms. Grolier are denied. The defendants' motion for an
award of costs and attorneys' fees is also denied.

SO ORDERED.
C. Extension of Time to Subpoena
*5 Discovery in this case closed on November 28,
1997. PRescient learned of the Macy's marketing material
three days later, as a result of the defendants' December

End of Document
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2014 WL 11071540 (Utah Dist.Ct.) (Trial Order)
District Court of Utah.
4th District Court
Utah County
SCHOONOVER PLUMBING & HEATING, Plaintiff,
V.

BENEDICA LLC, Defendant.
No. 130400594.
May 20, 2014.

Order Denying Statement of Discovery Issues

Derek P. Pullan, Judge.

*1 Defendants filed a statement of discovery issues seeking to exclude documents Plaintiffs failed to discluse in intitial
disclosures.
Rule 4-502 requires attorneys to meet and confer, in person or by telephone, and attempt in good faith to resolve or
narrow the issues presented without court involvement.
Defendant argues that this requirement does not apply because the parties agreed prior to making initial disclosures that
failure to disclose would result in exclusion.
The Court disagrees. Meeting and conferring to resolve the deficiencies in initial disclosures is a prerequisite to seeking
relief under Rule 4-502.
Defendants' counsel did not meet and confer with Plaintiffs' counsel and attempt in good faith to resolve the purported
deficiencies in Plaintiffs' initial disclosures.
Therefore, Defendants' Statement of Discovery issues is premature and denied without prejudice.
Date: 5/20114
<<signature>>
Judge DEREK P. PULLAN

WESTLAW
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Wesley v. Gates, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2009)
2009 WL 1955997

2009 WL 1955997
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

This decision was reviewed by West editorial
staff and not assigned editorial enhancements.
United States District Court,
N.D. California.

each party's legal positions. 3 To the extent the parties
wish to refer to exhibits previously submitted, they may
doso.

Hilton I. WESLEY, Plaintiff,

v.
Robert M. GATES, Defendant.

The Court makes the following rulings regarding
plaintiffs motion to quash the subpoena issued to OJI
Consulting, Inc. and defendant's motion to compel the
authorization of release of plaintiffs SSA and EDD
records.

No. C 08-2719 SI.

(:Ji

It is the Court's view that a further in-person meet and
confer is required and may resolve some. if not all. of
the parties' current disputes. The Court orders counsel to
meet in person no later than July 10, 2009, and to make a
good faith attempt to resolve each dispute. If any disputes
remain, the parties shall file no later than July 15, 2009 a
single joint letter. no longer than ten pages, which outlines

I
July2,2009.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Mary M. Dryovage, Law Offices of Mary Dryovage,
Wendy Ellen Musell. Stewart & Musell, San Francisco,
CA, for Plaintiff.
Victoria R. Carradero, Michael Thomas Pyle, U.S.
Attorney's Office. San Francisco, CA, for Defendant.

ORDER RE: VARIOUS DISCOVERY MOTIONS

SUSAN ILLSTON, District Judge.

*1 Between May 28 and July I, the parties flooded the
Court with letter briefs and declarations concerning a
plethora of discovery disputes. 1 It is clear that discovery
has become highly contentious. It also appears that there
has been a near total breakdown in the meet and confer
process, as counsel assert in various letters that they have
filed at least some of the instant discovery motions after
not receiving a response to a meet and confer proposal.
Counsel accuse each other of discovery misconduct and
of reneging on previous agreements reached in the meet
and confer process, and there are suggestions that at
some point counsel stopped talking to one another

I. Plaintiff's motion to quash defendant's subpoena of D.JI
Consulting, Inc. and for protective order
Plaintiff has moved to quash a subpoena duces tecum
and to prevent defendant from taking a Rule 30(b)( 6)
deposition of on Consulting, Inc., a third party. DJI
Consulting is operated by plaintiff and has no employees
.other than plaintiff. Plaintiff asserts that defendant is
impermissibly trying to take a second deposition of
plaintiff, while defendant contends that the deposition is
necessary to obtain mitigation and damages information
that has not otherwise been forthcoming.
The Court finds that defendant is entitled to take
the Rule 30(b) (6) of on Consulting, Inc. because
"the depositions of an individual who is noticed as an
individual witness pursuant to Fed.R .Civ.P. 30(b)(I)
and who is also produced as a corporate representative
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(b)(6) are presumptively
subject to independent seven-hour time limits." Sabre
v. First Dominion Capital, LLC. No. 01-CIV-5145BSJHBP, 2001 WL 1590544, at *l-2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.12,
2001). Accordingly, plaintiffs motion to quash the
subpoena served on OJI Consulting, Inc. is DENIED.
Dkt. No. 48. 4

')

and communicated only by written correspondence ...
Counsel are reminded to conduct themselves with the
professionalism and civility required of them as members
of the court.

II. Defendant's motion to compel authorization of release
of SSA and EDD records
The Court agrees with defendant that plaintiffs
records at both the Social Security Administration
("SSA") and California's Employment Development
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Department ( .. EDD'") are rdevant to plaintiffs disability
discrimination claims. See Frede11hurg \'. Contra Costa
County [)l'pl. u( Health Sern.. 172 F.3d 1176, 1181
(')th Cir. I()99): Johnson v. Oregon. 141 F.3d 1361. 136g70 (9th Cir.i99g;. Furthermore. the Court may order
plaintiff to sign the required authorization releasing
the SSA and EDD records. See Santillan "· City 4
Reedley. No. 07--391-AWI. 2008 WL 62180 (E.D.Cal.
Jan.4. 2008); Puckett v. Dyer, 05-277--0WW, 2007
WL 2462162 (LO.Cal. Aug.29, 2007). Accordingly.
the Court GRANTS defendant's motions to compel
plaintiffs authorization of release of his SSA records,
Dkt. No. 75. and defendant's motion to compel plaintiff

to produce outstanding discovery is GRANTED in part
to require plaintiff's authorization of release of his EDD
records. Dkt. No. 81. Plaintiff will provide the required
authorization forms to defendant no later than July 9,
2009. Any documents that are received from either the
SSA or EDD will be subject to the prolet.:livc order in place
in this case.

*2 IT IS SO ORDERED.

All Citations
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2009 WL 1955997

Footnotes

1
2

The parties' discovery papers are found from Docket Nos. 48-97 and 115-124.
Counsel are reminded that the local rules require that meet and confer sessions be conducted either over the telephone
or in person. Local Civil Rule 37-1 provides that the Court "will not entertain a request or a previously conferred for the
purpose of attempting to resolve all disputed issues." See Civ. Local R. 37. To" 'meet and confer' or 'confer' means
to communicate directly and discuss in good faith the issue(s) required under the particular Rule or order.... [S]uch
communication may take place by telephone. The mere sending of a written, electronic, or voice-mail communication,
however, does not satisfy a requirement to 'meet and confer' or to 'confer.' Rather, this requirement can be satisfied
only through direct dialogue and discussion-either in a face to face meeting or in a telephone conversation." See Civ.
Local R. 1-5{n).

3

The Court is not interested in the parties' competing versions of the history of discovery in this case. The parties are
instructed to file a single joint letter because the parties' lengthy oppositions and replies on each discovery dispute have

4

Of course, the parties may be able to obviate the need for the Rule 30(b)(6} deposition in the meet and confer process.

presented the Court with a moving target that is not helpful to resolving any dispute.

End of Document
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